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The federal class action has lost its way.  It was created fifty years ago 
in a major revision to Rule 23 that envisioned the class action as a functional 
aggregation device aimed at promoting litigation efficiency and effective 
enforcement of substantive rights.  Over the past twenty years, however, 
courts have added technical limitations that restrict the Rule’s functional 
efficacy.  This Article examines two such limitations: a strict version of class 
ascertainability, and restrictions on cy pres relief.  These limits are neither 
mandated by the text of Rule 23 nor supported by a reasonable interpretation 
of the Rule’s language and purpose.  Proponents advance functional 
arguments, but those arguments fail to persuade.  This raises an obvious 
question: why is support so strong when the proffered justifications are so 
weak?  The answer to this question is important for what it reveals about the 
underlying normative stakes.  The strongest arguments for class action limits 
sound in legitimacy, not functional efficacy.  As a result, it is critical to 
engage the legitimacy arguments on their own terms. 
Many of the recent Rule 23 limitations have to do, in one way or 
another, with the kind of group that can qualify as a litigating “class.”  In a 
series of decisions beginning in the late 1990s, the Supreme Court insisted 
that a group have internal unity, that it be internally “cohesive,” before it can 
be a Rule 23 class.1  As I have explained elsewhere, these decisions have 
resulted in the tightening of Rule 23’s commonality and predominance 
requirements.2 
This Article examines two other limitations—strict ascertainability and 
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 1.   See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (“The Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”). 
 2.   Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 
677–704 (2014) [hereinafter Bone, Misguided Search]. 
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limits on cy pres.  Ascertainability imposes requirements on class definition.  
The traditional version of ascertainability is relatively easy to satisfy; it 
demands only that the boundaries of the class be reasonably clear.3  Over the 
past five years, however, some courts, led by the Third Circuit, have 
imposed a much stricter version.4  They insist not just that the class itself be 
defined clearly, but also that individuals be identifiable as members of the 
class in a reliable and administratively feasible way.  This strict requirement 
has potentially severe consequences: it can scuttle small-claim class actions, 
especially consumer class actions involving low-priced items.5 
The other limitation involves the cy pres doctrine.  This doctrine, which 
has been around for decades, allows a court to distribute class recovery to a 
third-party charity when distribution to the class is infeasible or undesirable.6  
The cy pres doctrine is particularly useful in class actions aggregating small 
claims.  Because class members with only small amounts at stake seldom 
bother to claim their shares of a settlement fund, it is quite common for a 
large portion of the fund to be left over after an initial effort to distribute it to 
the class.  Cy pres is a convenient way to dispose of these leftover funds: a 
court gives the money to a charity engaged in activities that indirectly 
benefit the class as a whole.7 
Despite its advantages, cy pres has attracted considerable controversy 
over the past seven years.  Critics argue that it exacerbates agency costs, 
invites judicial abuse, deprives class members of their property, and violates 
due process.  Some of these critics would go so far as to abolish the practice 
altogether.8  Even supporters of cy pres worry about its unrestricted use, and 
many favor rather stringent limitations.9 
                                                          
 3.   See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 4.   See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 5.   See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015); Myriam Gilles, 
Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 
DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307 (2010); Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 
2354, 2360, 2377–78 (2015); Daniel Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name that 
Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2393 (2014); see also infra notes 50–66 and 
accompanying text (explaining strict ascertainability requirements). 
 6.   See Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 114–
18 (2014). 
 7.   Id. at 102–05, 117 (describing circumstances in which cy pres is used to solve the 
distribution problem and noting that “litigants and courts have enthusiastically latched onto cy pres 
as a potential solution to the problem of unclaimed class action settlement funds”).  
 8.   See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 
641–51, 665–66 (2010). 
 9.   See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 6, at 117–25, 136–62 (discussing problems with cy pres 
distributions and proposing restrictions); Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 771–73, 784–97 (2014) (discussing problems with cy pres and supporting 
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These developments figure prominently in proposed legislation now 
pending before Congress.10  Section 1718(a) of the so-called “Fairness in 
Class Action Litigation Act” requires a plaintiff to show, as a condition to 
obtaining class certification, that there is a “reliable and administratively 
feasible mechanism (a) for the court to determine whether putative class 
members fall within the class definition and (b) for distributing directly to a 
substantial majority of class members any monetary relief secured for the 
class.”11  This provision would appear to enact a strict version of 
ascertainability.  Moreover, by insisting on substantial distributions to class 
members, it also restricts the use of cy pres.12 
At first glance, ascertainability and cy pres might seem to have little in 
common.  They operate at different stages of the litigation—ascertainability 
is relevant at the class certification stage, while cy pres applies at the remedy 
stage—and they perform different functions.  Nevertheless, the two 
doctrines are closely linked.  Cy pres eases the pressure to require strict 
ascertainability by making it unnecessary to identify all class members at the 
remedy stage.13  And vice versa: insisting on strict ascertainability at the 
certification stage makes it possible to identify class members when 
distributing class recovery at the remedy stage, and thus reduces the need for 
cy pres. 
More importantly, strict ascertainability and restrictions on cy pres are 
connected normatively.  Courts often justify these limiting doctrines in 
functional terms as promoting the efficiency and fairness of class action 
litigation.14  But as I explain in Parts II and III below, the functional 
justifications fail in rather obvious ways.  In fact, strict ascertainability and 
restrictions on cy pres have the opposite effect: they undermine the 
                                                          
a reform partly on the ground that it would reduce the need to rely on cy pres). 
 10.   H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 11.   Section 1718(a) provides in full that: “A Federal court shall not issue an order granting 
certification of a class action seeking monetary relief unless the class is defined with reference to 
objective criteria and the party seeking to maintain such a class action affirmatively demonstrates 
that there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism (a) for the court to determine 
whether putative class members fall within the class definition and (b) for distributing directly to a 
substantial majority of class members any monetary relief secured for the class.”  Id.   
 12.   The bill passed the House on March 9, 2017, and as of this writing is pending before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. See CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/985/actions (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). 
 13.   If cy pres were readily available, one could imagine a judge saying something like the 
following: “There’s no reason to worry about ascertainability at this early certification stage.  If the 
class recovers, efforts will be made at that time to distribute the proceeds to class members.  If it 
cannot all be distributed because some class members cannot be identified, the court will use cy pres 
to distribute whatever remains.” 
 14.   See infra Parts II and III. 
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functional efficacy of the class action.  Hence the question: Why does 
support remain so strong when the functional justifications are so weak? 
The answer, I shall argue, is that the restrictive approach is not just 
about functional efficacy.  It is also about adjudicative legitimacy, and the 
legitimacy-based arguments have greater force.  Legitimacy in this context is 
concerned not so much with whether restrictive rules make the class action 
work better, but rather with whether they make the class action fit the 
institution of civil adjudication better.  On this view, it is not enough that a 
class action promotes litigation efficiency, effective enforcement of 
substantive rights, and other functional goals in a fair and manageable way.  
The class action must also fit what the judicial system is legitimately 
supposed to do, and this means that the class suit must qualify as a proper 
litigating unit—the class must be sufficiently cohesive and have clearly 
defined boundaries and identifiable class members, and the lawsuit must 
seek compensation for claimants whose legal rights have been violated. 
As I argue below, many of the functional arguments can be reframed as 
legitimacy arguments without much reworking.  And as arguments from 
legitimacy, they are more difficult to address.  This does not necessarily 
imply that proponents of strict ascertainability and limited cy pres are 
actually making legitimacy-based arguments cloaked in functional terms.  It 
is impossible to know for sure what they intend.  However, it does mean that 
legitimacy concerns lurk close to the surface. 
If I am correct about this, then the debate over class-action limits today 
is taking place at the wrong normative level.  As long as both sides argue in 
terms of functional goals, they are bound to talk past one another.  The way 
to join issue and make progress is to pitch the debate at the level of 
adjudicative legitimacy.  This is not easy to do.  Making sense of legitimacy 
requires a theory of adjudication, and articulating such a theory is a 
challenging task.  It is quite understandable that courts and commentators 
would wish to avoid it.  Yet it cannot be avoided.  The class action forces all 
of us to confront it squarely. 
The body of this Article is divided into four parts.  Part I briefly 
describes the pragmatic and functional vision that shaped the 1966 revision 
of Rule 23.  It also sets the stage for the analysis in subsequent sections by 
distinguishing between a “functional” argument and an argument based on 
“adjudicative legitimacy.”  Part II describes the strict ascertainability 
requirement and critically examines the conventional arguments used to 
justify it.  These arguments either fail on their own terms or make 
controversial assumptions that are not adequately defended.  Part III does the 
same for the cy pres doctrine.  It describes cy pres and shows that none of 
the conventional arguments for limiting its application are convincing. 
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Part IV then revisits the case for strict ascertainability and limited cy 
pres.  It argues that both developments are better grounded in adjudicative 
legitimacy than functional efficacy.  The concern about adjudicative 
legitimacy implicates two related beliefs.  The first holds that civil 
adjudication is primarily about compensating injured parties.  Deterrence 
matters, but only if it is accompanied by a substantial compensation benefit.  
The second belief is closely related to the first.  It holds that civil 
adjudication is about adjudicating and enforcing legal rights belonging to 
individual right holders.  Thus, even if class actions are needed to effectively 
enforce substantive rights, they can still lack legitimacy when they involve 
anonymous class members and prioritize deterrence over compensation for 
rights violations. 
These beliefs fit a plausible conception of civil adjudication.  Together 
they describe a core feature that distinguishes adjudication from legislation 
and administration: its focus on legal rights and on remedies for rights 
violations.  Yet this feature does not demand strict ascertainability or the cy 
pres limits that have become popular in recent years.  Small-claim class 
actions, such as those enforcing consumer protection laws, share much in 
common with 23(b)(2) class actions for classwide injunctive relief.  Part IV 
develops this analogy and shows how it can be used to justify the legitimacy 
of small-claim class actions with unidentifiable class members and liberal 
use of cy pres. 
I.  THE 1966 REVISION OF RULE 23 
In 1966, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules revised Rule 23 to 
replace a formalistic and relatively narrow representative suit device with a 
new and broader class action procedure structured along functional lines.  At 
the heart of this revision was a normative shift from rights-based formalism 
to policy-based functionalism.  The following discussion briefly describes 
this shift and then defines the distinction between a “functional argument” 
and one based on “legitimacy,” a distinction that plays a key role in the rest 
of the analysis. 
A. A Functional Rule 23 
As is well known, the 1938 Advisory Committee aimed for a simple and 
uniform set of procedural rules designed to adjudicate cases in an efficient, 
“streamlined” way based on the facts and the relevant law.15  In keeping 
                                                          
 15.   See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
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with this broad goal, the Committee rejected the technicalities of common 
law and code procedure and crafted the new Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) along functional and pragmatic lines.16  For example, the 
FRCP simplified pleading so that cases could be decided on the merits, 
expanded permissive joinder so that courts could entertain efficient litigating 
units, instituted broad discovery so that parties could ferret out all the 
relevant facts and evidence, and innovated with summary judgment and the 
pretrial conference.17  But not all of the new Rules were designed 
functionally.  The Committee chose a different approach for three party 
structure rules: Rule 19 (compulsory joinder), Rule 24 (intervention), and 
Rule 23 (class action).  These three Rules retained the formalistic character 
and limited scope of their nineteenth and early twentieth century 
counterparts.18 
In particular, Rule 23 was organized around formal categories of legal 
rights.19  This structure was meant to track distinctions among different 
types of class actions recognized in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
                                                          
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78–98 (1988) 
[hereinafter Bone, Mapping] (tracing the history of the twentieth century reform movement).   
 16.   See id.  Charles Clark, the Reporter to the 1938 Advisory Committee and chief architect of 
the 1938 Federal Rules, was a moderate legal realist and pragmatist, as were many of the other 
influential procedure reformers of the period.  It should not be surprising then that the new Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure reflected the realist’s commitment to pragmatic functionalism.  See id.; see 
also David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of 
Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 453–70 (2010) (arguing that Charles Clark was a legal realist and 
that drafting the Federal Rules was a realist project). 
 17.   See Bone, Mapping, supra note 15, at 98–107; Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions 
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 
691, 728–29 (1998).  
 18.   It is not clear why the Advisory Committee rejected a functional approach to these Rules.  
See Bone, Mapping, supra note 15, at 107–14 (discussing this question in connection with Rule 19).  
One possibility is that the Committee’s focus was elsewhere.  Its primary concern was to eliminate 
the unnecessary cost and delay of code and common law procedure and to enable decisions based on 
the facts rather than on technicalities.  This focused Committee attention on the technical pleading 
requirements, narrow permissive joinder rules, and limited discovery of code and common law 
procedure.  The Committee may have thought that the representative suit, compulsory joinder, and 
intervention rules did not implicate these concerns in a central enough way.  Moreover, at least the 
representative suit was used so rarely that the Committee may also have thought it did not warrant 
much attention.  Finally, representative suits, compulsory joinder, and intervention all have serious 
effects on litigant autonomy not just procedural efficiency, and the Advisory Committee may not 
have known how to address the resulting fairness concerns.  See id. 
 19.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938) (distinguishing among “joint,” “common,” “secondary,” 
and “several” rights).  Also, Rule 19 relied on the nineteenth century concept of “joint interest” and 
the formalistic category of “indispensable” parties.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (1938); Bone, Mapping, 
supra note 15, at 107–14 (discussing Rule 19).  And Rule 24 limited intervention narrowly to cases 
of preclusion and property distribution.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (1938); FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 
advisory committee’s note to 1938 rules (“This rule amplifies and restates the present federal 
practice at law and in equity.”). 
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centuries.20  “Joint” or “common” (or “secondary”) rights supported what 
had previously been called the true class action; “several” rights supported 
hybrid class actions insofar as the object of the suit was to affect specific 
property, and “several” rights with a common question supported spurious 
class actions.21  Moreover, the preclusive effects of these three types of class 
action tracked the established representative suit precedent.  True class 
actions bound class members in the way the modern class action does.22  
Hybrid class actions bound class members only with respect to the property 
involved in the suit.23  And spurious class actions bound only those class 
members who chose to intervene.24 
Even though many federal judges found these formal rights-based 
distinctions difficult to understand and apply, the 1938 version of Rule 23 
remained in effect for twenty-eight years.25  In 1966, the Advisory 
Committee overhauled Rule 23 (along with Rules 19 and 24) to bring it 
more in line with the FRCP’s functional vision.26  The 1966 revision 
eliminated all reference to formal rights-categories and distinguished the 
different types of class action by the policy reasons for class treatment.  
Moreover, it turned the class action into a powerful preclusion device 
designed to bind all class members to the judgment.27 
                                                          
 20.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1938 amendment (“This is a 
substantial restatement of [former] Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule has been 
construed.”); James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 325 
(1937); see also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the 
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 288–90 (1990) [hereinafter Bone, 
Personal and Impersonal] (review essay) (describing parallels between Rule 23’s structure and early 
class actions, but also noting that the new Rule departed from precedent in significant ways). 
 21.   See James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions—Jurisdiction and Effect of 
Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 555 (1938).  Moore and Cohn illustrated the distinctions with 
examples of nineteenth and early twentieth century representative suits.  Id. at 556–63.  See also 1 
THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE §§ 547–49 (1909) (distinguishing between 
true and hybrid suits). 
 22.   See Moore & Cohn, supra note 21 at 556–63. 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Id.  
 25.   See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity, in THE THOMAS M. COOLEY 
LECTURES 251 (2d ser. 1950).  Courts applying the original Rule 23 had great difficulty 
distinguishing between joint, common, and several rights, and stretched and twisted these concepts 
to generate the types of preclusive effect they thought desirable.  See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendment.   
 26.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966).  The 1966 Advisory Committee also eliminated the 
references to joint interest and indispensable parties in Rule 19 and rewrote Rule 19 to identify the 
practical reasons for requiring joinder of an absentee.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s 
note to 1966 amendment.  Moreover, the Committee expanded the availability of intervention and 
tied intervention as of right to situations where the intervenor’s interests would be seriously harmed 
if she were not allowed to intervene.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 24, advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment.  
 27.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; 7AA CHARLES 
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In keeping with these goals, the 1966 drafters targeted cases where there 
were strong functional reasons to preclude class members.28  Thus, Rule 
23(b)(1) authorizes a class action to prevent unfair externalities produced by 
individual litigation, such as the unfair distributional consequences of 
allowing multiple plaintiffs to sue individually for a limited fund.29  Rule 
23(b)(2) authorizes a class action to promote remedial efficacy, such as 
securing the remedial advantages of a classwide injunction.30  Finally, Rule 
23(b)(3), the most ambitious innovation of the 1966 Rule, replaces the old 
spurious class action with a much more expansive aggregation device aimed 
at improving litigation efficiency and decisional consistency,31 as well as 
enabling private enforcement of the substantive law.32 
The 1966 revision also created a new certification procedure that 
delegated responsibility to the trial judge to ensure that Rule 23’s 
requirements were satisfied.33  In addition, the new Rule gave the trial judge 
                                                          
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1789 (3d ed. 2005).  Even though the 1966 Rule was intended to preclude class members, the 1966 
advisory committee made clear that the class action court could not prejudge res judicata effect.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Whether a class member would 
be precluded by a class judgment was for a subsequent court to decide if a class member tried to sue 
again.  See id. 
 28.   See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1968) (“The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake the law of class actions free of abstract 
categories contrived from such bloodless words as ‘joint,’ ‘common,’ and ‘several,’ and to rebuild 
the law on functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation 
through representative parties.”).  
 29.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1774, at 30–35 (3d ed. 
2005).  When many individuals have claims on a fixed fund that is too small to pay all the claims, 
Rule 23(b)(1) can be used to force the claimants to litigate together so the court can equitably 
allocate the limited fund among them and bind everyone to that result.  See id.  
 30.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation 
and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 660–61, 695–711 (2011) 
(explaining that the 1966 committee drafted (b)(2) to facilitate broad injunctive relief in 
desegregation suits).  A class action matches the scope of the lawsuit to the scope of the relief sought 
and ensures that all those affected can enforce the decree.  See id. at 679–80.  
 31.   See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 390 (1967) (noting that the new 
(b)(3) aims “to get at the cases where a class action promises important advantages of economy of 
effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the 
class or for the opposing party”). 
 32.   See id. at 397–98; Kaplan, supra note 28, at 497–500.  In addition, the (b)(3) class action 
improves the quality of outcomes by helping to equalize economy-of-scale advantages, and thus 
litigating power, across the party line.  See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to 
Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 347–48 
(2014) (noting that the class action nullifies the defendant’s opportunity to gain more from 
investment and scale economies).  However, it is not clear that this was an explicit goal of the 1966 
committee.  
 33.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (1966).  At the time, Rule 23(c)(1) provided that “the court 
shall determine by order whether [the suit] is to be . . . maintained [as a class action].”  Id.  See 
generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 
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tools to help manage the class action fairly and efficiently.34  The Committee 
also worried about the due process rights of absent class members. To 
address this concern, it included 23(a)(4), which instructs the judge to 
determine that class representatives and the class attorney will adequately 
represent the interests of absent class members, and 23(a)(3), which 
demands that the representative’s claims be typical of the claims of class 
members.35  And for (b)(3) damages class actions, the Committee also added 
a special due process safeguard: it gave class members a right to opt out of 
the class and avoid its binding effect.36 
The important point is that the 1966 drafters envisioned the Rule 23 
class action as a functional aggregation device aimed at improving the 
quality of litigation outcomes and saving litigation costs.  Since it bound 
absent class members, the new device had to comply with due process 
requirements.  But the due process protections included in Rule 23 left wide 
room for class aggregation. 
Since the late 1990s, however, courts have made it more difficult to 
certify class actions that seem quite sensible on functional grounds.  They 
have done so by construing existing certification requirements narrowly and 
imposing additional requirements beyond those explicitly mentioned in Rule 
23.37  In a previous article, I examined one of these additional requirements, 
the necessity that a class be “cohesive.”38  This Article examines two 
others—strict ascertainability and restrictions on the use of cy pres. 
                                                          
1911–16 (2014) (describing growing reliance on discretion in the wake of 1966 Rule 23). 
 34.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (1966) (listing some procedural tools for managing class actions); 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (1966) (authorizing issue classes and subclasses); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e) (requiring judicial review and approval of class settlements).  
 35.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4).  In the famous 1940 case Hansberry v. Lee, the Supreme 
Court recognized adequate representation of interests as a basis for binding nonparties.  311 U.S. 32, 
42–43 (1940).   
 36.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (1966).  The 1966 version of Rule 23 added an additional 
safeguard by mandating notice to the class in a (b)(3) class action and requiring that the notice 
instruct class members that they have a right to opt out.  Id.  The current version of Rule 23 does the 
same thing but with revised language. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  
 37.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 745–823 
(2013) (providing an overview of the many court imposed restrictions on class actions).  But see 
Robert H. Klonoff, A Respite from the Decline, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2881484 (arguing that the restrictive trend has 
subsided a bit since 2013).   
 38.   In 1997, the Supreme Court recognized a separate class cohesion requirement.  See 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).  As I have argued elsewhere, this 
interpretation of predominance is not supported by the history of Rule 23 or required by the 
efficiency and law enforcement goals of the (b)(3) class action.  Bone, Misguided Search, supra note 
2, at 678–79.  In fact, the Amchem Court justified its cohesion requirement on grounds of 
adjudicative legitimacy, and ever since the Amchem decision, class cohesion, in one way or another, 
has influenced a number of restrictive class action developments, including a stricter approach to 
(b)(3) predominance, denying monetary relief as part of a (b)(2) class action, and restricting the 
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These two requirements make it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain 
certification of (b)(3) class actions that aggregate claims too small to justify 
individual suits.  The primary purpose of a small-claim class action is to 
enable private enforcement of the substantive law and ensure that 
wrongdoers whose activities create small amounts of harm to many 
individuals are held accountable for their wrongful conduct.39  As we shall 
see, neither strict ascertainability nor substantial limits on cy pres make 
functional sense in these cases; nor are they required by due process.  This 
then frames the puzzle: Why have they garnered the support they have? 
B. Clarifying Terminology 
Before proceeding, it will be useful to clarify some terminology.  
Throughout the following discussion, I contrast “functional” arguments with 
arguments based on “adjudicative legitimacy.”  A functional argument 
focuses on the goals of the class action or the demands of due process.  By 
contrast, a legitimacy argument focuses on whether a class action of the type 
requested is a proper form of procedure for courts.  The class action might 
do a fine job of serving functional goals and be acceptable to all class 
members, yet still not be legitimate for the institution of civil adjudication. 
Legitimacy arguments collapse into functional arguments when the 
theory of adjudicative legitimacy is functional in the same way.  But they 
diverge when legitimacy demands something more.  For example, 
certification of a small-claim class action despite unidentifiable class 
members and with liberal use of cy pres can effectively deter violations of 
the substantive law without adversely affecting absentee participation (since 
absentees have too little at stake to be interested in participating).  Yet this 
type of class action can still raise legitimacy concerns.  A critic might worry 
that a class action with anonymous members, a deterrence focus, and no 
meaningful compensatory purpose is too different from established forms of 
litigation to qualify as a proper mode of civil adjudication. 
 
                                                          
certification of issue classes. Id. at 677–704.   
 39.   See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 
2768 (2013); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 7–11 (1991). 
2017 JUSTIFYING CLASS ACTION LIMITS 923 
II.  ASCERTAINABILITY 
The following discussion focuses on the ascertainability requirement.  It 
first distinguishes between the traditional version and the newer and much 
stricter version.  It then critically examines the policy reasons advanced to 
support the stricter version and explains why those reasons fail. 
A. Strict versus Weak Ascertainability 
It is well accepted that a class must be ascertainable before it can be 
certified.40  In the past, the ascertainability requirement has been relatively 
easy to satisfy.  In recent years, however, courts have adopted a much 
stricter version.  I shall refer to the traditional requirement as “weak 
ascertainability” and the new requirement as “strict ascertainability.”41  
Weak ascertainability focuses on ascertaining the dimensions of the class 
itself; strict ascertainability focuses on ascertaining the identities of 
individual class members. 
More specifically, weak ascertainability imposes three constraints on 
how a class is defined.  First, the class definition must be clear and definite 
enough so that the boundaries of the class are apparent and individuals can 
determine whether or not they are members.42  Second, the class must be 
defined by reference to objective criteria rather than subjective state-of-mind 
factors.43  Third, the class must be defined in terms that do not refer to 
success on merits-related issues.44 
There are sensible policy reasons for each of these three requirements.  
A clearly defined class assists plaintiffs in deciding whether or not they are 
members for purposes of exercising opt-out rights, and also helps the 
                                                          
 40.   See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We and other courts 
have long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and 
that membership be defined by objective criteria . . . .”). 
 41.   See id. at 659, 661 (referring to a “weak” version and a “more stringent” version). 
 42.   See id. at 659–60; 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1760, at 136–42.  Rule 
23(c)(1)(B) also requires that the court, when certifying a class action, “must define the class and the 
class claims, issues, or defenses.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also Wachtel v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that 23(c)(1)(B) “requires district 
courts to include in class certification orders a clear and complete summary of those claims, issues, 
or defenses subject to class treatment” and that an appellate court reviewing compliance with 
23(c)(1)(B) should inquire into “whether the precise parameters defining the class and a complete 
list of the claims, issues, or defenses . . . are readily discernible from” the certification order or 
memorandum).  
 43.   See 5 J. SOLOVY, R. MARMER, T. CHORVAT, AND D. FEINBERG, MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, § 23.21[3][a] (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
 44.   See id. § 23.21[3][c]. 
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defendant evaluate its liability exposure.45  Moreover, insisting on objective 
criteria facilitates later preclusion determinations.  For example, if a class 
were defined as all persons “discouraged from applying for assistance,” a 
later court deciding the preclusive effect of the class judgment would have to 
determine whether the plaintiff was discouraged from applying, which 
would likely involve costly evidence production and hearings.46  Finally, the 
rule prohibiting definitions based on merits-related success avoids “fail-
safe” classes, in which class members are bound only if the class wins.47  
Fail-safe classes are thought to be unfair to the defendant because the class 
action provides no preclusion benefit for the defendant when it prevails.48 
From a functional perspective, these requirements make sense only if 
they are flexibly applied.  There are costs as well as benefits to a sharper, 
more objective, and less merits-dependent class definition, especially when 
it is not easy to improve the existing definition in these ways.  For this 
reason, the requisite degree of ascertainability should be determined by a 
cost-benefit balance.  Ascertainability should depend on the policies 
favoring class action treatment, the benefits of providing a more precise, 
objective, or merits-neutral class definition, and the difficulty of improving 
the class definition along these lines.49  Weak ascertainability allows for this 
sort of analysis. 
Strict ascertainability works differently.  It requires that the named 
plaintiff show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a reliable 
and administratively feasible way to ascertain whether an individual is in 
fact a member of the class.50  It is not enough that a putative class member 
                                                          
 45.   See Shaw, supra note 5, at 2377.  For example, a class defined in terms of “young people” 
would likely be too indefinite, since an eighteen-year old could not be certain whether she was in the 
class.  Id. 
 46.   Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 47.   An example is a class defined to include all defrauded consumers.  If the class loses and 
the court finds that no consumer has been defrauded, then the class, as defined, has no members and 
the class judgment binds only the named plaintiffs. 
 48.   2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:6 (5th ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS]. 
 49.   The requisite degree of clarity and definiteness should depend, in part, on the court’s 
ability to manage the class action as the plaintiff has defined it and the benefits and costs of a more 
precise definition, including the likelihood that class members might want to opt out.  The rule 
against subjective criteria should turn on the ease of defining the class in objective terms and the 
consequences of a subjective definition.  The balance for fail-safe classes rarely makes a difference 
because a class can almost always be defined independent of merits success.  But if it were difficult 
to do so, a fail-safe class might be tolerated when the policies served by class certification are strong 
enough and the adverse consequences of a fail-safe class not terribly serious.  See id. § 3:6 (noting 
that some courts take a more flexible approach to fail-safe class definitions). 
 50.   See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 Fed. Appx. 945, 947–48 (11th Cir. 2015); 
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 
F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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can determine membership for herself.51  The court and the defendant must 
be able to verify membership in a reliable and cost-effective way.52  
Moreover, this requirement is not flexible in the way an ascertainability 
requirement should be.  Instead, it is mandatory for certification and not 
subject to cost-benefit balancing. 
As a practical matter, the most salient difference between the two types 
of ascertainability involves the kind of evidence required to prove class 
membership.  Strict ascertainability excludes self-serving affidavits unless 
the plaintiff is able to show a sufficiently reliable method for verifying their 
accuracy.53  Weak ascertainability is much less demanding.  To satisfy weak 
ascertainability, it is rarely necessary at the certification stage to prove the 
existence of a method for identifying class members.54 
To illustrate strict ascertainability, consider the facts of Carrera v. 
Bayer Corp., the Third Circuit case that is widely recognized as the first to 
clearly articulate a strict ascertainability rule.55  Bayer sold a multivitamin 
and dietary supplement known as WeightSmart and advertised its benefits 
for increasing metabolism.56  The named plaintiff, Gabriel Carrera, sued on a 
false and deceptive advertising claim, alleging that WeightSmart did not 
confer the metabolism benefits that Bayer claimed for it.57  She sought 
                                                          
 51.   See, e.g., Karhu, 621 Fed. Appx. at 948. 
 52.   It is not always easy to determine whether a court is applying strict or weak 
ascertainability.  The problem is partly semantic.  Courts sometimes express the ascertainability 
requirement in terms of the feasibility of determining membership without making clear who it is 
that is supposed to be able to determine membership—the class members themselves and a 
subsequent court applying preclusion (supporting weak ascertainability), or the class action court 
and the class defendant (supporting strict ascertainability).  Also, a class definition can fail both 
tests, in which case the court does not have to choose between them.  See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic 
of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (“clarify[ing] that the touchstone of ascertainability 
is whether the class is ‘sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to 
determine whether a particular individual is a member,’” but denying certification on grounds that fit 
weak ascertainability) (citations omitted).  
 53.   See, e.g., Karhu, 621 Fed. Appx. at 949.  Thus, strict ascertainability does not rule out 
affidavits categorically.  See id.  However, as we shall see, it sets a high standard for verifying the 
truthfulness of the assertions in an affidavit, a standard that is often difficult to meet. 
 54.   And when it is, a method relying on class member affidavits will normally suffice.  Some 
courts that subscribe to weak ascertainability worry about affidavits when there are special reasons 
to doubt the memory of class members, such as when the lawsuit targets only one of several different 
varieties of the same brand and consumers are unlikely to recall which variety they purchased.  See, 
e.g., In re Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 52 (D.N.H. 2015); Kosta v. 
Del Monte Foods, Inc., 308 F.R.D. 217, 227–29 (N.D. Ca. 2015). 
 55.   Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 56.   Id. at 304.  A package of fifty tablets sold for $8.99 and a package of 100 tablets for 
$16.99.  Id. 
 57.   Id. 
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damages on behalf of a class defined as “all persons who purchased 
WeightSmart in Florida.”58 
Bayer opposed class certification on the ground, among others, that the 
class definition did not meet the ascertainability requirement.59  Carrera’s 
class definition plainly satisfied weak ascertainability.  The definition was 
clear and definite enough: a consumer either purchased WeightSmart in 
Florida or did not.  Any WeightSmart consumer in Florida who wanted to 
opt out, for example, could easily tell whether she was a member of the 
class.  Moreover, it was sufficiently objective: membership did not depend 
on a consumer’s subjective state of mind.  And it was wholly independent of 
the merits: class members were clearly bound whether they won or lost. 
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that the class definition did not 
satisfy strict ascertainability, at least not without additional evidence 
showing a feasible and reliable way to identify class members.60  Bayer sold 
only to retailers and thus had no information about which consumers 
purchased WeightSmart.61  Moreover, retailers did not keep complete 
records of WeightSmart purchasers.62  And most WeightSmart consumers 
would not have retained their receipts.63  The plaintiff, Carrera, suggested 
that class members could file their own affidavits attesting to the fact that 
they purchased WeightSmart, but the Third Circuit rejected this approach as 
insufficiently reliable.64  The Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to 
show a reliable and administratively feasible way to identify those persons 
belonging to the class, and on that ground it vacated the district court’s grant 
of certification.65 
As many critics have noted, Carrera’s strict ascertainability requirement 
threatens to scuttle consumer class actions.66  Those who buy low-priced 
items usually throw away their receipts; retail stores rarely keep records of 
purchasers, and manufacturers have no way to know who bought an item 
downstream.  So there is likely to be no evidence to prove class membership 
other than the uncorroborated testimony of the buyers themselves. 
To be sure, not all courts have embraced strict ascertainability.  The 
                                                          
 58.   Id. 
 59.   Id. at 304–05. 
 60.   Id. at 311–12. 
 61.   Id. at 304. 
 62.   Id. at 308–09. 
 63.   Id.  
 64.   Id. at 309–12. 
 65.   Id. at 312. 
 66.   See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 662–72 (7th Cir. 2015); Shaw, supra 
note 5, at 2377–78; see also Gilles, supra note 5 (noting the adverse effect on consumer class actions 
of a strict approach to ascertainability even before Carrera was decided).  
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Third Circuit has endorsed it67 with the Eleventh Circuit indicating support68 
and quite a few lower courts following suit.69  However, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected it in a strongly worded and carefully reasoned opinion,70 and the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead,71 as have 
a number of lower courts.72  Many federal courts of appeal have not yet 
taken a position on the issue, and it is too early to tell how the circuit conflict 
will finally be resolved.73 
                                                          
 67.   See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163–65 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2014); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 354–56 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–94 
(3d Cir. 2012).  But see Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 560–63 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that strict 
ascertainability does not apply to 23(b)(2) class actions exclusively seeking injunctive or declaratory 
relief).  However, there has been some resistance from district courts in the Third Circuit.  See, e.g., 
City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., No. 13-4595, 2015 WL 5769951, at *8–9 
(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2015) (following binding Third Circuit precedent to reject certification, but noting 
that a defendant’s “lack of records and business practices makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to 
ascertain the members of an otherwise objectively verifiable low-value class, which may cause class 
members to suffer” and that “[s]everal courts have criticized the Third Circuit as imposing too high 
of a burden on plaintiffs”) (citations omitted). Some read Byrd, supra, as a modest retreat from 
Carrera’s strict ascertainability requirement.  But I do not read the case that way.  Byrd clarifies 
strict ascertainability and distinguishes it from other Rule 23 requirements, but it does not retreat 
from a strict standard. See Byrd, 784 F.3d, supra, at 163 (affirming the strict ascertainability 
requirement).  To be sure, the court makes clear that a plaintiff need not necessarily “be able to 
identify all class members at class certification,” just show that they can be identified in a reliable 
and administratively feasible way.  Id.  However, as the court notes, this was already clear from 
Carrera.  Id. 
 68.   See Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 Fed. Appx. 945, 947–48 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 69.   Hughes v. Ester C Co., 317 F.R.D. 333, 348–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that Second 
Circuit district courts have “reached contrary results” on ascertainability and denying that there is a 
trend in the Second Circuit toward rejecting strict ascertainability) (citations omitted); Xavier v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Weiner v. Snapple 
Beverage Corp., No. 07 CIV 8742, 2010 WL 3119452, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (finding 
a class not ascertainable when the putative class consisted of purchasers of Snapple beverages).  See 
generally Gilles, supra note 5, at 310–12 (collecting earlier cases). 
 70.   Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659–72 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 71.   Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1126–32 (9th Cir. 2017); Rikos v. Procter 
& Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 72.   See, e.g., In re Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 48–52 
(D.N.H. 2015) (quoting Mullins extensively while rejecting Carrera and finding ascertainability 
satisfied despite lack of proof-of-purchase within consumer class); Belfiore v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 311 F.R.D. 29, 65–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting conflict between Mullins and Byrd and deciding 
that “[b]ecause it is unlikely that consumers will retain receipts for low cost items such as wipes, 
plaintiff may rely on affidavits for those without receipt . . . . To require receipts would render class 
actions against producers almost impossible to bring.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation 
omitted); Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Co., 317 F.R.D. 374, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(noting the conflict between Carrera and Mullins and rejecting strict ascertainability because “denial 
of class certification in consumer protection cases like these on the basis of ascertainability would 
severely contract the class action mechanism as a means for injured consumers to seek redress under 
statutes specifically designed to protect their interests.”) (citation omitted).  
 73.   See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 995–96 
(8th Cir. 2016) (noting that a class “must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable” and that 
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Notably, the major treatises on federal procedure do not stake out a clear 
position in this debate.  They tend to mush the different approaches together 
as if they were all just slight variations on the same ascertainability theme.74  
This is a bit surprising, but maybe not totally inexplicable.  Strict 
ascertainability has intuitive appeal that can make it appear to be a sensible 
extension of the ascertainability requirement.  At first glance, it might seem 
quite reasonable that the defendant, the court, and the class attorney should 
all be able to tell at some point in the litigation who it is that is actually 
alleging the rights violation and pressing a claim for relief.  After all, it is not 
customary for courts to adjudicate lawsuits brought by persons whose 
identities are not even reasonably knowable.  As we shall see, this is one of 
the core concerns that supporters of weak ascertainability must address. 
B. A Critical Look at the Policy Reasons for Strict Ascertainability 
It is quite remarkable that ascertainability has become so prominent, 
especially since Rule 23 does not even mention it.  Some courts locate the 
requirement in Rule 23’s prefatory clause,75 which they interpret to require 
the existence of a “class” as a pre-condition to applying Rule 23’s express 
provisions.76  Whatever the merits of this interpretation, it does not support 
strict ascertainability.  A class can exist without anyone knowing precisely 
who is and who is not a member.77 
                                                          
the Eighth Circuit had not yet “outlined a requirement of ascertainability,” and seeing no need to 
choose between the prevailing views) (citation omitted). 
 74.   See, e.g., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 48, § 3:3 (noting different views but 
collapsing them all into a single ascertainability requirement without clearly marking the 
distinctions); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1760 (noting differences as if they were slight 
variations on a single ascertainability requirement).  But see 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra 
note 43, § 23.21[3][a] (clearly marking the difference between strict and weak ascertainability, yet 
still presenting the distinction as just two ways to apply ascertainability without evaluating the merits 
of each approach or exploring the policy implications).  
 75.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating that “one or more members of a class may sue . . . as 
representative parties” if certain conditions are satisfied). 
 76.   See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 48, § 3:2.  They hold that a class exists only 
if it has a clear, definite, and objective definition.  Id.  But see Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1124–26 (9th Cir. 
2017) (concluding that a sensible construction of Rule 23 does not imply an “administrative 
feasibility” requirement, i.e., strict ascertainability). 
 77.   Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires that a judge certifying a class action define the class and the 
class claims, issues, or defenses in her certification order.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).  But it says 
nothing about being able to identify individual class members, and few courts applying strict 
ascertainability rely on 23(c)(1)(B).  See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
2015) (holding that strict ascertainability is distinct from 23(c)(1)(B)); NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS, supra note 48, § 3:2 (noting that only a “minority” of courts rely on 23(c)(1)(B)).  This is 
sensible.  Subsection (c)(1)(B) was added to Rule 23 in the 2003 rule amendments and the advisory 
committee note says nothing about the provision.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) advisory committee’s 
note.  Given this silence, it seems likely that the committee did not mean to make any change in 
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Courts sometimes argue that the inherent character of a class action or 
the intrinsic nature of a class requires strict ascertainability.78  But 
formalistic arguments of this sort never work.  There is nothing intrinsic to a 
class or essential to a class action that demands ascertainability.  Insofar as a 
class is a litigating group, it is quite sensible to treat the identities of 
individual members as subsumed in the identity of the group and thus 
irrelevant to class certification—unless identification of class members is 
needed for functional reasons.  Indeed, if strict ascertainability inhered in the 
nature of a class action or the idea of a class, one would expect it to apply to 
all class actions.  Yet even the Third Circuit, the strongest proponent of a 
strict ascertainability rule, declines to apply it to class actions certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2).79 
Not surprisingly, then, policy arguments rather than formalisms are 
central to the case for adding strict ascertainability to Rule 23, and the 
debate is mostly framed in policy terms.  Supporters insist that strict 
ascertainability is necessary so that class members can receive adequate 
notice, later courts can determine the preclusive effect of a class judgment, a 
class action can be managed efficiently, class recovery can be distributed to 
the class, and the defendant can have a fair opportunity to present its 
defenses and contest class membership.80  The following discussion 
examines each of these points in turn.  It relies to a considerable extent on 
                                                          
existing class definition law, which at the time required only weak ascertainability.   
 78.   E.g., Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162–65 (noting that “[t]he source of, or basis for, the 
ascertainability requirement as to a Rule 23(b)(3) class is grounded in the nature of the class-action 
device itself,” but also discussing policy reasons for the rule).  I shall argue that the policy 
justifications do not do the primary normative work.  Instead, they serve simply as examples of why 
a class action without ascertainability is not a legitimate device. 
 79.   Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559–63 (3d Cir. 2015).  See infra notes 206–212 and 
accompanying text. 
 80.   See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 5, at 2366 (noting that “the most common arguments for the 
ascertainability requirement” are the notice-and-opt-out argument, the distribution argument, and the 
preclusion argument).  The Third Circuit in Carrera relies on opt out, manageability and efficiency, 
and the defendant’s supposed due process right to test class membership.  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that strict ascertainability allows “potential class members 
to identify themselves for purposes of opting out of a class,” “ensures that the parties can identify 
class members in a manner consistent with the efficiencies of a class action,” and “provides due 
process by requiring that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove 
class membership”); see also Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015) (summarizing the policy 
arguments in Marcus v. BMW and Carrera v. Bayer Corp.).  In criticizing the strict ascertainability 
requirement, the Seventh Circuit targets four policy arguments that proponents advance: (1) that it 
promotes administrative convenience (essentially the manageability and efficiency argument), (2) 
that it ensures fairness to absent class members by facilitating individual notice for opt out, (3) that it 
avoids the unfairness to injured class members of distributing recovery to uninjured parties, and (4) 
that it protects the due process interests of the defendant and facilitates the defendant’s use of 
preclusion in a later suit.  Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663–72 (7th Cir. 2015); see 
also Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1127–32. 
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work by others criticizing these arguments on functional grounds, including 
an excellent student Note on the subject.81 In each case, it also makes the 
link to legitimacy explicit. This then sets the stage for the discussion in Part 
IV, which focuses on the quite different legitimacy-based arguments for 
strict ascertainability. 
1. Notice and Opt-Out 
One common argument for strict ascertainability is that it is needed to 
provide the notice that Rule 23(b)(3) requires.82  Rule 23 provides that “the 
court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.”83  The purpose of this notice 
requirement is to inform class members of their right to opt out or “enter an 
appearance through an attorney.”84 
This notice argument does not work. One can concede the need for 
(b)(3) notice and still reject strict ascertainability.  There is no Rule 23 or 
due process requirement that notice actually reach each and every class 
member or even that it be personally directed toward each individually.85  
Rule 23 requires only that individual notice be given to “members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort.”86  As some have argued, the linking 
of individual notice to reasonable identifiability assumes that there will 
sometimes be class members who cannot be identified.87  And those who are 
not identifiable can still receive notice through print media, television, the 
Internet, and other forms of publication.88 
                                                          
 81.   The student Note is: Shaw, supra note 5.  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in Mullins, supra 
note 80, and the Ninth Circuit in Briseno, supra note 80, both review the functional arguments with 
some care.  My discussion repeats many of the same points, but it also refines the analysis in some 
respects. 
 82.   See, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305–06; Shaw, supra note 5, at 2367–69 (criticizing the 
notice argument). 
 83.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).   
 84.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)(B)(v) (recognizing an opt-out right); FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(2)(B)(iv) (recognizing a right to appear). 
 85.   See Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1321 (11th Cir. 2012); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. 
Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, § 23.102[2] 
(noting that notice need not be actually received).  See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–15 (1950) (holding that the due process requirements for notice depend 
on a balance of individual and government interests). 
 86.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).   
 87.   Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015); Shaw, supra note 5, at 
2367–69. 
 88.   See Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 786.  And to give this publication notice, all one needs is the 
kind of clear class definition that weak ascertainability guarantees.  
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Also, there is no strong policy reason to provide individual notice to 
members of a small-claim class.  Class members have too little at stake to 
make individual litigation cost-justified and therefore have no reason to opt 
out or intervene.  The empirical evidence confirms this point.  The opt-out 
rate in small-claim class actions is vanishingly small, and absent class 
members virtually never intervene.89  Under these circumstances, strict 
ascertainability creates a Catch-22.  It guarantees individual notice by 
making it impossible for class members to sue, and thus assures notice will 
never be given because no lawsuit will ever be brought.90 
Still, there is something odd about a court adjudicating a class action 
when there is a good chance that no absent class members can be clearly 
identified.  What makes this odd, however, is not the inability to give notice.  
The notice difficulty is symptomatic of a deeper problem.  That problem has 
to do with the impossibility of individuating class members with individual 
damages claims.  When class members are anonymous, neither the named 
plaintiff nor the class attorney can attend to their individual interests.  It is 
true that the class attorney represents the class as a whole.91  But it is still 
troubling that she has no way to take account of possibly divergent class 
member interests on an individual basis when evaluating the interests of the 
class.  Anonymity also limits the relationship between the judge and 
individual claimants.  When the judge has no way to individuate class 
members, she has no way to treat class members as individuals with distinct 
rights claims.  But all of these concerns sound in legitimacy, not functional 
efficacy.  The inability to give individual notice is just a symptom of the 
anonymity baked into the class.  I explore these points further in Part IV. 
 
                                                          
 89.   See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: 
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 133 (2006) (reporting that 
two studies show less than a 1% opt out rate).  
 90.   Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Practically 
speaking, a separate administrative feasibility requirement would protect a purely theoretical interest 
of absent class members at the expense of any possible recovery for all class members—in precisely 
those cases that depend most on the class mechanism.”).  There is also no need for the notice 
requirement to do substantial work in every (b)(3) class action for it to make sense as part of Rule 
23.  There are (b)(3) suits where it is possible to identify absent class members relatively easily, 
including large claim class actions for personal injury and small-claim class actions where class 
members can be identified from the defendant’s records. 
 91.  MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, § 23.120[2][c][i] (“[A]n attorney appointed 
class counsel must represent the interests of the class as a whole rather than the interests of 
individual class members.”).  
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2. Preclusion 
Another common policy argument is that strict ascertainability is needed 
to assure that a later court can readily give preclusive effect to a class 
judgment.92  To see this point clearly, suppose that a class is certified, the 
class action settles, and the court approves the settlement.  A plaintiff, 
unhappy with the settlement, files a subsequent lawsuit against the same 
defendant on the same claim.  The defendant argues that the plaintiff was a 
member of the earlier class and thus is precluded by the class settlement.  To 
decide the preclusion issue, the court must determine whether the plaintiff 
was in fact a class member, and strict ascertainability makes this easy to do 
by assuring that class members can be readily identified. 
The defect in this argument is that strict ascertainability is not necessary 
for this purpose.93  Weak ascertainability works perfectly well.  The reason 
is simple.  The class-action court does not predetermine the preclusive effect 
of its judgment; the judge in the subsequent suit raising a preclusion issue 
makes that determination.94  This later judge does not have to identify all 
class members to perform this task.  She need only determine whether the 
plaintiff in the second suit was a member of the previous class, and all she 
needs to do that is a clear class definition.  Indeed, the plaintiff in the 
subsequent suit will often allege enough to self-identify as a class member.  
And even if class membership is not evident from the complaint, simple 
discovery will likely reveal the truth and support a summary judgment 
motion. 
For example, suppose the Carrera class action had been certified and 
the district judge had approved a settlement.  Suppose that, after final 
judgment, a WeightSmart customer, unhappy with the settlement, decided to 
file a separate suit alleging a claim based on the same events.  That 
consumer would have to plead that she purchased WeightSmart during the 
period that the ads were circulating, and this allegation would place her in 
the Carrera class as long as the purchase was made in Florida.95 
                                                          
 92.   See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2374 
(noting the argument before criticizing it). 
 93.   See Shaw, supra note 5, at 2374–78. 
 94.   7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1789. 
 95.   Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304; see also Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1130 n.9 (discussing a similar 
hypothetical).  The state in which the purchase was made might be clear from the complaint or 
inferable from the plaintiff’s state of residence at the time of the purchase.  It is possible that 
someone else might file a second class action overlapping with the first.  But the second court should 
be able to identify the overlap, assuming the class definitions in the first and second suits are clear 
and definite enough.  Having identified the overlap, the second court can force the attorney to 
redefine the class to exclude the precluded class members. 
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In fact, class members in small-claim class actions have too little at 
stake to file separate suits.96  This is, after all, why a class action is 
necessary.  To be sure, a consumer class action based on a big-ticket item, 
such as a luxury car or boat purchase, might include some class members 
with large enough stakes.  But sellers are more likely to keep records in such 
cases, especially when, as seems likely for high-priced items, consumers rely 
on financing. 
All of this is so obvious that it is surprising proponents of strict 
ascertainability make this argument.  However, the argument has more force 
when it shifts from the practical difficulties of applying preclusion doctrine 
to the class-action court’s inability to identify those whose rights it is 
judging (and who will as a result be precluded by its judgment).  From this 
perspective, what matters is that the class-action court rendering the 
judgment have at least some way to know the individual rightholders who 
will be affected by its actions.  In sum, the focus of concern is the anonymity 
of class members, just as it was for notice. 
3. Ensuring Manageability and Securing Efficiency Benefits 
Proponents of strict ascertainability sometimes point to the way the rule 
facilitates judicial management of class actions.97  Without strict 
ascertainability, they argue, a court would have to do more work at the 
certification and supervision stages, which would undermine the efficiency 
benefits that justify (b)(3) certification.98  The problem with this argument is 
that it does not justify strict ascertainability as a separate, mandatory Rule 23 
requirement.  To manage a class action effectively, a judge must know the 
nature of the class claims and the common questions, as well as the facts of 
the dispute.  She need not know the identities of individual class members. 
For example, a judge is perfectly capable of evaluating the (b)(3) 
predominance requirement as long as she is familiar with the class claims, 
common issues, and general facts.  A judge does not actually decide any 
individual questions when determining predominance; she merely 
determines whether individual questions exist and how important they are 
relative to the common questions.  And she can do that without knowing 
                                                          
 96.   Not all small-claim class actions necessarily fit this profile.  In securities fraud class 
actions, large institutional investors have enough at stake to litigate separately.  However, strict 
ascertainability normally presents no problem in those cases because courts can usually identify 
class members from the defendant’s records.  
 97.   See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012); Carrera, 
727 F.3d at 307. 
 98.   Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. 
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anything about individual cases.99  Similarly, in evaluating adequacy of 
representation for purposes of 23(a)(4), the judge does not ask whether 
particular individuals in the class are adequately represented; rather, she asks 
whether the attorney and named plaintiffs will adequately represent the class 
as a whole.100 
Even if strict ascertainability did help with class action management, 
this fact alone would not support adopting the requirement.  Rule 23 treats 
manageability as just one factor in a (b)(3) superiority determination.101  
While management difficulties increase the costs of class treatment, those 
costs must be balanced against the benefits of a class action.  The problem 
with strict ascertainability is that it creates an absolute bar to certification 
regardless of the social benefits that a class action might generate.102 
There is one class management issue that deserves special attention.  
Class actions, and especially small-claim class actions, are rife with agency 
problems.  The class attorney often litigates without much, if any, oversight 
from class members, and this makes it possible for the attorney to settle with 
the defendant for a large fee and a small payout to the class.103  Rule 23 
relies mainly on the judge to control these agency costs.  For example, the 
judge chooses the class attorney; reviews a class settlement to check that it is 
fair, adequate, and reasonable; and also determines the amount of the class 
attorney’s fee.104 
The question then is whether strict ascertainability helps to reduce the 
risk of agency problems.  It is difficult to see how it could.  A judge does not 
need to know the identities of class members to choose a loyal class 
attorney, evaluate a class settlement, determine the fee award, or perform 
any of the other management tasks that reduce agency costs.  Still, strict 
                                                          
 99.   Consider a consumer fraud claim.  A judge does not have to know the identity of any class 
member to determine whether reliance is an individual question.  All she has to know is the nature of 
the claim being asserted and sufficient facts to decide whether the defendant made uniform 
statements or instead customized its statements to individual consumers.  
 100.   It is also worth noting that the Third Circuit’s strict ascertainability rule requires only that 
the plaintiff show that class members can be identified, not that the plaintiff actually identify them at 
the certification stage.  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding strict 
ascertainability “does not mean that a plaintiff must be able to identify all class members at class 
certification” but only that they can be identified).  This somewhat weakens any argument that 
identifying class members is important for evaluating certification requirements.  
 101.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
 102.   See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2015) (criticizing the 
administrative convenience argument on this ground); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 
1121, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting a “freestanding administrative feasibility requirement” as a 
condition to certification and supporting a case-specific manageability inquiry taking account of 
Rule 23 policies). 
 103.   See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 19–25. 
 104.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (g), (h).  
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ascertainability might help in a different way if for some reason agency 
problems were more serious for class actions with mostly unidentifiable 
members.  It is possible, for example, that an attorney would be more willing 
to sell out a class with anonymous members than a class whose members the 
attorney knows or could imagine knowing.  However, this possibility 
depends on questionable assumptions about attorney psychology, and these 
assumptions need to be empirically verified.  In fact, it seems likely that any 
psychological effect of this sort would depend on the individual amounts at 
stake.  When class members have very little at stake, as in small-claim class 
actions, they have little reason to care about the lawsuit, and if they do not 
care, it is unlikely that the class attorney will care much about their interests 
even if he knows who they are. 
Indeed, many view the class attorney in a small-claim class action as a 
private attorney general representing the public interest in effective 
deterrence rather than the interests of individual class members in 
compensation.105  On this view, agency problems manifest when the attorney 
agrees to a settlement that fails to meet the substantive law’s deterrence 
goals.  But there is no reason to believe that an attorney’s incentives to 
promote the public interest depend on the identifiability of class members.  
Even a perfectly loyal private attorney general has no particular reason to 
care about the class except to the extent that class recovery promotes 
deterrence. 
As with the notice and preclusion arguments, it is possible to recast this 
argument in legitimacy terms.  If one believed that class actions without 
identifiable class members were not proper litigating units, it would not be 
surprising for one also to believe that such a problematic litigating entity 
would be difficult to manage and require creative approaches at odds with 
traditional methods. Thus, a concern about manageability might be linked to 
a deeper concern about legitimacy.  And the legitimacy concern is more 
difficult to dismiss. 
4. Distributing Class Recovery 
A common argument for strict ascertainability focuses on the 
distribution of class recovery.106  In small-claim class actions that settle, 
notice is sent to class members inviting them to file claims to the settlement 
                                                          
 105.   See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 89, at 131–39; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class 
Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2069–70 (2010). 
 106.   See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 5, at 2369–74. The distribution argument for strict 
ascertainability is often treated as part of class action management—difficulties identifying class 
members make it more difficult for a judge to manage the remedy stage.   
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fund.107  If it is important that the funds be distributed only to claimants who 
are in fact class members, a court must be able to determine with confidence 
whether a claimant is a member of the class. 
This distributional argument works only if one accepts its premise, that 
all class recovery must be distributed to class members and only to class 
members.  This rules out alternative methods of distribution, such as cy 
pres.108  But ruling out cy pres at the outset begs the question whether cy 
pres is an appropriate method of distribution. 
Moreover, strict ascertainability solves the distribution problem in a 
particularly draconian way.  When courts reject class member affidavits as 
unreliable, they scuttle any hope of class certification, and thus assure there 
is no settlement to distribute, leaving class members with nothing at all.109 
From a functional perspective, there are alternatives that serve the 
purposes of the small-claim class action much better.  Cy pres, for example, 
solves the distribution problem by directing any left-over funds to a 
charity.110  In addition, there is no reason to reject class member affidavits 
on the ground that effective distribution requires strict standards of 
reliability.  Given that a class member’s testimony of injury and causation 
could support an award of damages in an individual suit, it is not at all 
obvious why a stricter rule should apply to class actions.111 
                                                          
 107.   Only a small fraction of the class usually files, leaving a large chunk of the fund 
undistributed. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action 
Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 119–20 (2007). 
 108.   See infra Part III. 
 109.   See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2015); In re Dial 
Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 48–52 (D.N.H. 2015).  There is another 
version of the distributional argument.  According to this version, distributing recovery to anyone 
who files an affidavit supporting her entitlement invites frivolous filings, and paying frivolous 
claimants dilutes the recovery available for deserving class members.  There are many flaws with 
this argument.  See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 666–69.  As a practical matter, frivolous filings would seem 
very unlikely in small-claim class actions, when the filer stands to receive little for her trouble.  
Furthermore, because few legitimate class members actually file claims on the fund, it is highly 
unlikely that anyone’s recovery would be diluted; there should be ample proceeds to pay all 
claimants.  Finally, frivolous claims are not unique to the class action; they are a problem in 
individual litigation as well.  Courts have a number of tools to deal with the problem.  These tools 
are not perfect, of course, but it makes no sense to impose a stringent requirement just in the class 
setting, especially when that requirement scuttles certification and, with it, any hope of relief for 
deserving class members. 
 110.   See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The notion 
that an inability to identify all class members precludes class certification cannot be reconciled with 
our court’s longstanding cy pres jurisprudence.”). 
 111.   See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that 
affidavits are sufficient to distinguish injured from uninjured class members since unrebutted 
consumer testimony “would be sufficient to establish injury in an individual suit”); Mullins, 795 
F.3d at 669 (“If not disputed, self-serving affidavits can support a defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, for example, and defendants surely will be entitled to a fair opportunity to challenge self-
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Not surprisingly, the principle supporting the distributional argument—
that all class recovery must be distributed only to class members who can 
verify membership—is sharply contested.112  This principle does not 
promote the functional purposes of the small-claim class action; indeed, it 
undermines those purposes by scuttling the only realistic hope class 
members have of recovering something for their legal claims.  The principle 
can be justified, if at all, only as a matter of adjudicative legitimacy, as an 
argument that the class action is a legitimate form of civil adjudication only 
if it provides individual compensation for rights violations.  I address this 
argument in Part IV. 
5. Fairness to the Defendant 
Some supporters defend the strict ascertainability requirement on 
grounds of fairness to the defendant.  They argue that the defendant has a 
due process right to challenge the proof used to demonstrate class 
membership and also to contest any legal obligation to pay compensation to 
individual class members.113  To do this effectively, the argument goes, 
defendants must be able to identify class members in a reliable way, and 
strict ascertainability makes sure that this can be done.  While this argument 
has some superficial appeal, it fails for a number of reasons.114 
                                                          
serving affidavits from plaintiffs. We are aware of only one type of case in American law where the 
testimony of one witness is legally insufficient to prove a fact. . . . There is no good reason to extend 
that rule to consumer class actions.”).  In fact, more onerous proof requirements for class actions 
might violate the Rules Enabling Act by abridging class member’s substantive rights.  Cf. Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (holding that sampling is permissible in a 
class action if it is permissible in an individual suit, for otherwise the class action would alter 
plaintiff’s substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act). 
 112.   Compare Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 165 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Although we need 
not address the propriety of cy pres funds in this case, we do note that the risk of a cy pres fund is 
reduced, even if not entirely removed” by strict ascertainability) with Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1129 
(“The notion that an inability to identify all class members precludes class certification cannot be 
reconciled with our court’s longstanding cy pres jurisprudence.”).  
 113.   See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); Forst v. Live Nation 
Entm’t Inc., No. 14–2452, 2015 WL 858314, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2015).  Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (rejecting a sampling proposal as violating the Rules Enabling 
Act because it denies the defendant the right to litigate its defenses to individual claims: “a class 
cannot be certified on the premise that [the defendant] will not be entitled to litigate its statutory 
defenses to individual claims”).   
 114.   Proponents of the due process argument often cite cases that involve some form of 
statistical adjudication based on sampling.  In Carrera, for example, the Third Circuit cites 
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2008), which rejected a statistical 
method of calculating damages, and Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367, which rejected sampling to 
determine aggregate liability for backpay.  Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306–07.  However, these sampling 
cases are very different from the ascertainability cases.  Since sampling works by extrapolating from 
the results in a sample of cases, a defendant is able to present its defenses only in the sample cases.  
By contrast, relying on affidavits to establish class membership does not prevent the defendant from 
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First, there is no due process issue with class members self-identifying 
by filing their own affidavits.  A defendant is perfectly free to rebut the 
affidavit with any admissible evidence showing that the affiant is not a 
member of the class or that the affidavit is defective.115  The defendant 
might have difficulty doing so, but that does not ordinarily create a due 
process problem.116  In an individual suit, a plaintiff can rely on her own 
testimony to prove that she purchased the product and suffered a loss, and in 
that case it is up to the defendant to rebut that testimony, just as it is up to 
the defendant to counter an affidavit of class membership.117 
Second, defendant’s total liability is unaffected by the identity of 
individual class members.  Class member identity is relevant only for 
distribution and the defendant has no due process right to insist on any 
particular distribution.118  Nor does the defendant need to know the identities 
of class members in order to negotiate a reasonable settlement.  All it needs 
is an estimate of class size (for example, the number of consumers who 
actually purchased WeightSmart in Florida), average damages per class 
member, and the likelihood of losing at the liability stage.119  Class member 
affidavits have nothing to do with any of these estimates.  Affidavits enter 
the picture only when the settlement fund is distributed.120 
Third, as a practical matter, most defendants have little incentive to 
contest affidavits when the stakes are small.  Indeed, the due process 
argument is more likely a strategic ploy to scuttle class certification and 
avoid litigation altogether than a genuine effort to litigate individual issues.  
Without a class action, class members with small claims will not sue, and as 
result the defendant gets off scot-free.  Given that the defendant has little 
                                                          
offering rebuttal evidence in every case. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669–72.   
 115.   Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1131–32. 
 116.   Id. at 1132 (quoting Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669) (noting “there is no due process right to ‘a 
cost-effective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership’”).  
 117.   More generally, defendants can have difficulty proving that suits are frivolous, but that 
difficulty does not implicate due process rights. 
 118.   Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1132. 
 119.   This follows from the standard model of settlement bargaining.  See generally ROBERT G. 
BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) [hereinafter BONE, 
ECONOMICS OF PROCEDURE]. 
 120.   There is an exception.  The method of distribution can affect the defendant when a class 
action settlement includes a reversion clause that returns any unclaimed settlement funds to the 
defendant.  But reversion clauses make little sense as a policy matter and are generally frowned 
upon.  See, e.g., Bailes v. Lineage Logistics, LLC, No. 15-CV-02457-DDC-TJJ, 2016 WL 4415356, 
at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2016) (noting that reversion is the least desirable way to dispose of excess 
settlement funds); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 20 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2010) (noting that 
“[a] reversion clause creates perverse incentives for a defendant to impose restrictive eligibility 
conditions and for class counsel and defendants to agree to an inflated settlement amount as a basis 
for attorney fees” and recommending alternatives for distributing left-over proceeds).  
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incentive to contest affidavits at the distribution stage, there is no reason to 
preserve the option by insisting on strict ascertainability at the certification 
stage. 
Nor is strict ascertainability necessary to assure that the defendant can 
assert its substantive defenses to individual claims.  Whether the defendant 
has individual defenses is a function of the substantive law and can 
ordinarily be determined without identifying class members.121  To be sure, a 
defendant must know the facts of an individual case to mount a case-specific 
defense.  But it is unusual for case-specific defenses to be adjudicated in a 
class action; normally they are left to individual litigation.122  Indeed, if 
case-specific defenses raise too many individual issues, the judge will 
conclude that common questions do not predominate and deny 
certification.123 
Thus, the due process argument for strict ascertainability fails.  Yet there 
is something odd about a party being forced to defend against claims without 
any reasonable way to know who it is that is doing the forcing.124  It seems 
only fair that a defendant should be able to know the identity of the party 
bringing suit against it.  Normally plaintiffs cannot proceed anonymously 
unless they have a very strong reason to do so.125  However, concerns of this 
sort sound in legitimacy, not functional efficacy or due-process-based 
fairness. 
                                                          
 121.   Sometimes what would be an individual defense in an individual suit can be handled on an 
aggregative basis in a class action.  For example, if the defendant raises a statute-of-limitations 
defense, the class definition can be narrowed temporally to exclude class members who fall outside 
the statute-of-limitations window.   
 122.   See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1790, at 585–609. 
 123.   A result that only benefits the defendant when claims are too small to justify individual 
suits.  One might argue that strict ascertainability reduces the risk of frivolous class actions and thus 
relieves the pressure they exert on defendants to settle.  But this solution is overkill; it solves the 
problem by getting rid of consumer class actions entirely.  It is rather like addressing a problem of 
high litigation costs by getting rid of the court system.  It will work, but only by throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater.  
 124.   In a small-claim class action, the real “plaintiff” is the class attorney, not the class 
representatives or class members.  See Macey & Miller, supra note 39, at 5–6.  But recognizing the 
attorney as the actual opponent strains conventional assumptions about civil adjudication.  
 125.   See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that 
“[p]seudonymous litigation undermines the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings” and 
holding that “a district court has an independent obligation to ensure that extraordinary 
circumstances support such a request [for proceeding pseudonymously] by balancing the party’s 
stated interest in anonymity against the public’s interest in openness and any prejudice that 
anonymity would pose to the opposing party”); 5A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 1321, at 382–83 
(“[B]ecause of the presumption of openness with regard to American judicial proceedings, federal 
courts generally have been rather rigorous in not allowing the plaintiff to commence an action 
anonymously.”); see also William S. Kleinman, Note, Who is Suing You?: John Doe Plaintiffs in the 
Federal Courts, 61 TEX. L. REV. 547, 547 (1982) (noting that at common law a defendant had the 
right to know his accuser and discussing the limited exceptions to this rule). 
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III.  CY PRES 
The previous discussion explained why notice, preclusion, 
manageability, distributional efficacy, and defendant-focused fairness all fail 
as functional arguments for strict ascertainability.  As we saw, the 
distributional argument in particular depends to a large extent on the 
availability of cy pres.  If cy pres is impermissible or severely limited and if 
class recovery must go to class members, then the case for strict 
ascertainability is much stronger.  This is what ties strict ascertainability to 
cy pres.  The former makes at least some functional sense only if the latter is 
not an option.  Thus, it is important to examine cy pres with care. 
The following discussion analyzes the functional arguments for 
eliminating or severely restricting cy pres.  We shall see that these 
arguments are no more convincing than the functional arguments for strict 
ascertainability.  Still, like the ascertainability arguments, the cy pres 
arguments make more sense when recast in legitimacy terms.  Cy pres is 
troubling because it thrusts the regulatory dimension of adjudication to the 
forefront and elevates deterrence over meaningful compensation for rights 
violations. 
A. Background 
Cy pres is short for “cy pres comme possible,” which translates from the 
Norman French to as “as near as possible.”126  In the class action setting, the 
cy pres doctrine allows a court to distribute class recovery to a charity when 
it is impractical or undesirable to distribute it to individual class members.  
The idea is to choose a charity that is likely to use the funds for projects that 
indirectly benefit the class.127 
To illustrate, consider the facts of Lane v. Facebook, one of the more 
controversial cy pres cases.128  Plaintiffs sued Facebook for violations of 
                                                          
 126.   Wasserman, supra note 6, at 114.  Courts of equity used the cy pres doctrine in cases 
involving testamentary charitable trusts.  When the testator’s chosen beneficiary failed for some 
reason, the court would choose an alternate charity that served the testator’s charitable intent as 
closely as possible.  Id. at 114–15.  The assumption was that the testator/settlor of the trust would 
prefer that the trust continue through a slight change in beneficiary than that the principal revert to 
the residuary legatees.  Id.  
 127.   A close cousin of cy pres is fluid class recovery.  Instead of giving the left-over funds to a 
charity, however, fluid class recovery applies the funds to benefit a group that overlaps as much as 
possible with the class.  For example, left-over funds might be used to reduce the price of a service 
for future consumers on the assumption that a significant portion of past consumers harmed by the 
legal violation would use the service again.  See Redish et al., supra note 8, at 661–64.  Although I 
focus on cy pres, much of what I say applies to fluid recovery as well. 
 128.   Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. 
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federal and state privacy laws in connection with its Beacon program.  The 
Beacon program allegedly sent information about a Facebook member’s 
purchases to her Facebook “friends” without giving the member an adequate 
opportunity to block the communication.129  The plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief and damages on behalf of a nationwide class of more than 3.6 million 
Facebook users. 130 
Facebook settled the class action by agreeing to terminate Beacon and 
pay $9.5 million in damages.131  After deducting for attorney’s fees and 
miscellaneous expenses, about $6.5 million remained to be distributed to the 
class.132  It made no sense, however, to deliver these funds to individual 
class members because the per-member cost of distribution exceeded the 
amount available to distribute.133  So the parties agreed to distribute the fund 
to The Digital Trust Foundation, a charitable organization created by the 
parties as part of their settlement.  The Foundation was set up specifically to 
receive the settlement funds and use those funds to support programs aimed 
at educating Facebook users (and others) about protecting their identities and 
personal information online.134  A Facebook corporate official was 
appointed as one of the three original directors of the Foundation—and this 
aspect of the settlement generated considerable controversy.135 
The Lane case is unusual, though not unique, in distributing nothing at 
all to the class and creating an entirely new organization to serve as the cy 
pres beneficiary.136  More commonly, courts first attempt a distribution to 
the class and only afterward use cy pres to dispose of left-over funds.  
Moreover, the cy pres distribution is usually made to an established charity 
rather than a newly created entity.  Lane is typical, however, in one 
important respect: it involves distribution of a settlement fund rather than the 
proceeds of a litigated judgment.  Virtually all of the cy pres cases involve 
                                                          
Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); see, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 6, at 129–34 (treating Lane v. Facebook 
as an especially problematic application of cy pres).  
 129.   Lane, 696 F.3d at 816–17. 
 130.   Id. at 817–18. 
 131.   Id. at 817. 
 132.   Id. 
 133.   With 3.6 million Facebook users and 6.5 million dollars to distribute, each class member 
would receive $1.81 and the cost of identifying class members, organizing distribution, and paying 
for checks and postage was likely to exceed that amount.  
 134.   Lane, 696 F.3d at 817–18. 
 135.   As the Court notes, “[t]he initial three directors were Larry Magrid, a member of the 
federal government’s Online Safety and Technology Working Group and several other online safety 
organizations; Chris Hoofnagle, director of the Information Privacy Programs at the Berkeley Center 
for Law and Technology and former director for an office of the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; and most relevant here, Timothy Sparapani, Facebook’s Director of Public Policy and 
former counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union.”  Id. at 817.   
 136.   Wasserman, supra note 6, at 133–34. 
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settlements137—probably because most class actions settle—so the following 
discussion focuses on settlements as well.138 
Cy pres was not terribly controversial until a few years ago.139  In 2013, 
Chief Justice Roberts appended a “statement” to his vote for denial of 
certiorari in the Lane case, noting a number of serious cy pres issues that he 
thought should be addressed in a more appropriate case.140  Moreover, for 
the past five years, lower courts have sharply disagreed about when and how 
the remedy should be used.141  And many courts and commentators today 
either reject cy pres outright or admit considerable discomfort with its use.142  
Indeed, Professor Martin Redish and his co-authors have mounted a full-
scale attack,143 and even those more favorably disposed to the remedy still 
recommend rather strict limits on its use.144 
                                                          
 137.   I know of only one case in which a judge ordered cy pres after a fully litigated judgment—
Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990), which endorsed 
the use of cy pres but reversed the choice of cy pres beneficiary.   
 138.   Some judges believe they have more latitude to approve a cy pres provision in a settlement 
than they do to employ cy pres after a trial judgment. See, e.g., Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 
787 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that “we deal not with the court’s authority to distribute 
unclaimed funds to a third party . . . but the parties’ ability to decide how to best distribute funds” 
(emphasis in original)).  But see Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that “[a] proposed cy pres distribution must meet these standards regardless of whether the 
award was fashioned by the settling parties or the trial court.”). 
 139.   Cy pres has been a feature of class actions since roughly the mid-1970s, but apparently its 
use has increased markedly since 2000. See Redish et al., supra note 8, at 634–38, 653 (finding, in 
reliance on a data set of published opinions, that “[f]rom 1974 through 2000, federal courts granted 
or approved cy pres awards to third-party charities in thirty class actions, or an average of 
approximately once per year [and] [s]ince 2001, federal courts granted or approved cy pres awards in 
sixty-five class actions, or an average of roughly eight per year.”).  Moreover, it has generated 
intense controversy and come in for heavy criticism since about 2010.  
 140.   Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (mentioning in particular “when, if ever, [cy pres] 
relief should be considered” and “how to assess its fairness as a general matter”). 
 141.   Compare Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. 
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013); Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 Fed. Appx. 624 (11th Cir. 2015) 
with Klier v. Elf Atochem N.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 142.   See, e.g., Fraley v. Batman, 638 Fed. Appx. 594, 598–99 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[t]he problems with the application of cy pres to class actions are legion”); 
Bailes v. Lineage Logistics LLC, No. 15-cv-02457-DDC-TJJ, 2016 WL 4415356 at *7 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 19, 2016) (describing cy pres as a close second to reversion as a “least favored” method for 
disposing of unclaimed settlement funds); Abraham v. WPX Prods, Inc., 317 F.R.D. 169, 244 n. 46 
(D.N.M. 2016) (endorsing judicial creativity in distributing damages especially in “negative value” 
cases, but emphasizing that it is “loath to use” cy pres).  
 143.   Redish et al., supra note 8, at 665–66.  
 144.   See, e.g., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 48, § 12:32 (noting that “perhaps 
more than any other distribution method except reversion, cy pres has its critics” and that even 
though it is “likely the most prevalent method for disposing of unclaimed funds,” “there is 
something of a trend away from cy pres” and “appellate courts have increasingly put restrictions” on 
its use); Wasserman, supra note 6, at 134–62 (recommending limits on cy pres); Tidmarsh, supra 
note 9, at 792 (counting as an advantage of his fee proposal that it would reduce reliance on cy pres).  
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Limits on cy pres usually have to do with when cy pres can be used and 
which charities can be chosen as cy pres beneficiaries.  One common 
approach requires that a court first make a reasonable effort to distribute 
settlement funds to class members before considering the cy pres option.  
Indeed, the American Law Institute, in its highly influential Principles of the 
Law of Aggregation, endorses a rather strict version of this approach.145  It 
insists that any left-over funds after a first distribution be paid to the class 
whenever feasible, even if those payments end up providing additional 
distributions to class members who have already filed claims and received 
their shares.146  Only if it is not feasible to distribute to the class can the 
court consider cy pres, and even then the court is limited in its choice of cy 
pres beneficiary: there must be a close nexus between the cy pres beneficiary 
and the interests of the class and the goals of the substantive law.147 
Cy pres is not the only way a judge can dispose of left-over funds.  
However, all the other options have serious drawbacks.  One possibility is to 
give left-over funds back to the defendant, but this approach weakens 
deterrence.  Another possibility is to apply the funds to increase the shares of 
those class members who have already filed claims and received 
distributions (and thus have already self-identified).  But that gives some 
class members more than they are entitled to and treats them differently 
from other class members.  A third possibility is to escheat left-over funds to 
the state as abandoned property.  This is an attractive option in some 
respects.  It serves deterrence and avoids windfalls.  But it confers no benefit 
on class members apart from the general benefits the state provides to all its 
citizens, and it sacrifices an opportunity to further the substantive law 
indirectly by supporting an entity that advances the law’s substantive 
goals.148 
When compared with the alternatives, cy pres has some attractive 
features.  It serves deterrence better than returning funds to the defendant; it 
avoids windfalls to class members, and it directs left-over funds in a way 
                                                          
 145.   AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 
(2010) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. 
 146.   Id. § 3.07, cmt. b.  
 147.   Section 3.07(c) provides that “the court, when feasible, should require the parties to 
identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class.”  The 
“reasonably approximate” standard was also used in the Rule 23 conceptual proposal that the Rule 
23 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules circulated in 2015. REPORT OF THE 
RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 24 (April 2015), 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/jul2015/I._Rule_23_Subcommittee_Re
port-pgs_243-297.pdf. 
 148.   Professor Shay Lavie has proposed another alternative, which relies on a random 
distribution by lottery.  Shay N. Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the 
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1066–69 (2011). 
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that creates some benefit to the class.  Nevertheless, there are limits imposed 
on the use of cy pres, and those limits can generate significant social costs.  
For example, they can impede certification of socially valuable class actions.  
A judge must be confident that there is a manageable way to deal with any 
left-over settlement funds before she can grant certification, and cy pres 
offers a workable solution.  It follows that the more difficult it is for a court 
to rely on cy pres, the more difficult it can be for a court to certify a small-
claim class.149  And the more difficult it is to certify small-claim class 
actions, the less likely it is that the class action device will achieve its 
deterrence goals. 
Moreover, restrictions placed on cy pres add costs even when class 
actions are certified.  For example, the tighter the required nexus between 
the cy pres beneficiary and the class, the more costly it is to search for a 
suitable beneficiary.  Stricter requirements also give settlement objectors 
more to object about when challenging class settlements, and this can 
increase litigation costs.  And strict requirements can discourage parties 
from including cy pres provisions in their settlements, which can lead to 
greater judicial involvement and more reliance on the suboptimal 
alternatives of reversion and escheat. 
B. A Critical Look at the Policy Reasons for Restricting Cy Pres 
The standard functional objections to cy pres focus on three main 
concerns: agency costs, risks of judicial self-dealing, and misappropriation 
of class member property.150 
1. Agency Costs 
One argument against cy pres is that it weakens the incentives of class 
attorneys to maximize benefits for the class.  The idea is that a class attorney 
concerned only with her own fee has no reason to maximize class recovery 
when her fee is calculated as a percentage of the total settlement, including 
                                                          
 149.   It is usually apparent at the class certification stage that a class action will likely produce 
left-over funds.   
 150.   A fourth possible objection is that it increases administrative costs, especially when judges 
supervise the cy pres remedy.  But most class actions generate high administrative and management 
costs, and those costs are tolerated because of the benefits that the class action confers.  It is difficult 
to imagine that the marginal costs of using cy pres are terribly large compared to these other costs.  
In any event, proponents of costly restrictions on cy pres can hardly complain about the 
administrative costs of an unrestricted cy pres remedy. 
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the portion subject to cy pres.151  This argument has superficial appeal, but it 
does not survive careful examination. 
First, the existence of a cy pres component, by itself, should not 
adversely affect the total settlement.  Since the attorney’s fee depends on the 
total amount, the class attorney has an incentive to maximize the total.  In 
this regard, cy pres differs from coupon settlements with which it is 
sometimes compared.152  In a coupon settlement, the fee depends on the total 
market value of all the coupons regardless of the number actually 
redeemed.153  As a result, the class attorney receives a large fee and the 
defendant ends up paying a relatively small amount if, as is quite common, 
few class members redeem their coupons. With cy pres, however, the 
defendant reaps no benefit when class members fail to claim their shares; the 
defendant pays the full settlement amount regardless of cy pres.  To be sure, 
there are agency problems with class actions, but it is not clear that cy pres 
exacerbates them. 
Second, the class attorney does not benefit in any obvious way by 
directing proceeds to a cy pres beneficiary rather than to the class; her fee is 
the same in either case.154  The defendant might be willing to pay a higher 
                                                          
 151.   See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013); Jennifer 
Johnston, Cy Pres Comme Possible to Anything is Possible: How Cy Pres Creates Improper 
Incentives in Class Action Settlements, 9 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 277, 289–94 (2013).  Professor Martin 
Redish and his co-authors take the agency cost argument one step further.  Redish et al., supra note 
8, at 650–51.  They argue that, by weakening the incentives of class attorneys to maximize 
individual recovery, cy pres violates the constitutional due process rights of absent class members.  
Id. at 650.  I am not convinced.  First, as I explain in the text, cy pres does not necessarily weaken 
class attorney incentives, since the attorney gets the same fee with or without cy pres.  Second, and 
more important, the due process argument proves too much.  Agency problems are endemic to all 
principal-agent relationships.  So if the mere risk of an agency problem were enough to trigger a due 
process violation, many well-settled litigation practices would be in constitutional jeopardy.  For 
example, there is always a risk that a class attorney will act in her own self-interest at the expense of 
the class she represents, but no one suggests that this risk alone makes the class action device 
unconstitutional as a violation of due process.  Moreover, many ordinary procedures exacerbate 
attorney-client agency problems without triggering due process concerns.  For example, broad 
discovery makes it easier for attorneys hired on a fee-for-services basis to pad their billable hours at 
the expense of their clients.  Yet I am not aware of anyone who suggests that this risk alone makes 
broad discovery unconstitutional.  In short, while it is important to address the agency cost argument 
as a policy matter, it is not helpful to frame it as a due process violation; doing so only exaggerates 
the stakes and confuses the issues. 
 152.   See, e.g., Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d at 178; Wasserman, supra note 6, at 136–
49 (analogizing to coupon settlements); Johnston, supra note 151, at 291–92 (same).  It is also 
different from a reversionary settlement, in which the class attorney’s fee is based on the entire 
settlement even though any unclaimed portion reverts to the defendant. 
 153.   The Class Action Fairness Act tries to deal with this problem by requiring that class 
counsel’s fee be based only on the amount of the coupons actually redeemed.  28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) 
(2012).  
 154.   It is possible that the attorney for the class or for the defendant might seek a personal 
benefit from a cy pres distribution, such as supporting her alma mater or other institution in which 
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fee for the class attorney’s agreement to a cy pres clause if the defendant is 
connected with the cy pres beneficiary or stands to gain from cy pres in 
some other way.155  However, I am not aware of any reliable empirical 
evidence indicating that this is a serious problem.  Moreover, even if it is 
serious, it can be handled fairly easily by insisting that the beneficiary have 
no connections with the defendant or with any of the lawyers involved in the 
suit.  To be sure, defendants can publicize their charitable good works, but 
this benefit is rather attenuated and much weaker than a reduction in out-of-
pocket loss. 
Third, the critics assume that the primary goal of the class action is to 
compensate class members.  This is why agency costs are evaluated against 
the baseline of a class attorney devoted exclusively to maximizing class 
recovery.  However, small-claim class actions are primarily about 
deterrence, not compensation.156  This means that the class attorney is better 
viewed as an agent of the public interest, accountable to the public rather 
than to the class.  Thus, the critical question is whether cy pres increases the 
risk that attorneys will “sell out” the public’s interest in optimal deterrence 
by agreeing to settlements that deter too weakly.  It is not at all clear why 
that would happen. 
Fourth, if cy pres creates agency problems, there is an obvious solution: 
calculate fees as a percentage of the amount actually distributed to the class 
without regard to the cy pres component.157  There is a downside to this 
approach.  It runs the risk of either discouraging small-claim class actions 
and thereby weakening deterrence, or encouraging distributions to already-
claiming class members and thereby generating windfalls. 
However, there is another way to view the agency cost argument.  
Instead of being about class recovery, the argument might be about the 
adjudicative legitimacy of a form of litigation in which the attorney is center 
stage and the actual right holders do not count as a practical matter.  In other 
words, the concern might be that the litigation is structured so that the 
attorney has no reason to regard the class or class members in a fiduciary 
sense.  Cy pres is an obvious focal point for this concern because it 
highlights the problem in particularly dramatic fashion—class recovery is 
simply given away to a third party who has no legal rights at stake and no 
                                                          
she has a personal interest.  See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 122–25.  I do not know how often this 
occurs, but it can be handled in a relatively straightforward way by prohibiting the practice and 
enlisting the judge’s help to ensure that the choice of cy pres beneficiary is not tainted in this way. 
 155.   Id. at 120–21.  
 156.   See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 157.   Others have included this limitation in their proposals.  See Johnston, supra note 151, at 
289–91; Wasserman, supra note 6, at 137–42. 
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role in the suit.  Thus, as was the case for strict ascertainability, the flawed 
functional argument can be modified so that it expresses a more plausible 
legitimacy concern. 
2. Judicial Self-Dealing 
Many critics of cy pres worry that judges will choose their favorite 
charities or that parties will choose charities that judges prefer in the hope of 
influencing judicial approval of the settlement.158  There are some notorious 
examples of judicial self-dealing, and they have been widely publicized and 
roundly condemned.159  I do not know how pervasive this practice ever was, 
but I suspect that judges have largely curtailed it now that it has come in for 
heavy criticism.160  If it is still a problem, there is a fairly simple solution: 
bar the judge from approving a charity with which she currently has, or once 
had, a significant relationship.161 
The concern about judicial self-dealing sometimes takes a different 
form.  Critics argue that cy pres should be restricted or eliminated because it 
produces an appearance of impropriety even if it produces few actual 
instances of improper conduct.162  This form of the criticism makes it too 
easy for the critic; it eliminates any need to produce actual evidence of self-
dealing.  It focuses on public perceptions and assumes that the public will 
think less of judges or the court system—and possibly lose faith in the 
judiciary.  I know of no empirical evidence to support these assumptions, 
and I find them quite implausible.  It seems far-fetched that the public will 
abandon faith in the judiciary just because a class action rule creates a 
theoretical risk of judicial self-dealing. 
In fact, I suspect that frequently arguments about the appearance of 
impropriety are not really about appearances at all.  The reason that critics 
believe a measure like cy pres will appear improper is because they believe 
                                                          
 158.   See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 124–25.  
 159.   See, e.g., Editorial, When Judges Get Generous, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2007, at A20; 
Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at A14; see also 
Adam Liptak, When Lawyers Cut Their Clients Out of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A12; 
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 125 n. 119 (noting some examples).  Lawyers have their favorite 
stories, but as with all anecdotal evidence, one must be cautious about accepting these stories at face 
value. 
 160.   Charities sometimes lobby judges to be selected as cy pres beneficiaries. Johnston, supra 
note 151, at 285.  This may be unseemly, but it has the advantage of expanding the set of options 
beyond those the lawyers suggest and making it easier for a judge to identify promising recipients.  
In any case, if it is a problem, it can be prohibited without doing away with cy pres. 
 161.   This might increase the cost of identifying a suitable charity, but probably not by all that 
much. 
 162.   See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 124–25. 
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it is improper and attribute that belief to the rest of the public.  And they 
believe it is improper because they think it is not a legitimate part of a 
properly working system of civil adjudication. 
3. Misappropriating Class Funds 
One of the common criticisms of cy pres is that it redirects funds that 
belong to class members.  The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation strongly endorses the idea that all settlement funds are the 
property of class members: “funds generated through the aggregate 
prosecution of divisible claims are presumptively the property of the class 
members.”163  The Rule 23 conceptual proposal circulated in 2015 endorsed 
the same principle,164 and many judges and commentators follow it today.165 
There are several problems with the property argument.  First, any 
notion that distributions should go to class members because the funds are 
their property must deal with the fact that class counsel consents to cy pres 
relief on behalf of the class whenever a cy pres provision is part of a 
settlement.  Imputing consent in this way is susceptible to agency problems, 
to be sure, but the mere possibility of agency problems is not a good enough 
reason to dismiss consent out-of-hand.166  Provided that all class certification 
requirements are met, including adequacy of representation, the argument 
for consent has some force.167 
Second, a class member who has a chance to file a claim to a portion of 
the fund and chooses not to do so can hardly complain about not receiving a 
distribution.  If that class member ever had a property right to a 
proportionate share, she has waived her right by not filing a claim.  To be 
sure, a class member must have notice of the opportunity to file a claim 
                                                          
 163.   ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 145, at § 3.07 cmt. b.  Accordingly, section 3.07 limits the use 
of cy pres to situations where class distributions are infeasible and imposes restriction on the choice 
of cy pres beneficiary.  Id. 
 164.   REPORT OF THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 147, at 27. 
 165.   See, e.g., Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The 
settlement-fund proceeds, having been generated by the value of the class members’ claims, belong 
solely to the class members.”); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1064 (8th Cir. 
2015) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit in Klier that “settlement funds are the property of the class”). 
 166.   It is worth noting that there are also agency problems in ordinary attorney representation.  
 167.   At least as a reason not to impose special restrictions on cy pres beyond the customary 
review of class settlements for fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.  In this regard, it is worth 
noting that although some courts review cy pres provisions simply as part of an overall settlement 
review under the fair, reasonable, and adequate standard— see, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–74 (3d Cir. 2013)—most courts analyze cy pres provisions separately and 
apply distinct requirements to them.  
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before it is fair to imply a waiver, but a broad notice campaign is likely to 
reach many, if not most, members of the class. 
Third, and most important, this objection to cy pres assumes that 
undistributed funds are owned by class members.  This is a highly dubious 
assumption.  Each class member at most owns her particular share of the 
recovery.  Because of this, there is no argument from property rights to insist 
on distributing left-over funds to the same class members who have already 
received their shares.168  One might argue that all class members own the 
funds in common, but I do not see any basis for imputing common 
ownership when each has a separate and distinct legal right to relief.  Nor 
does it make any sense to attribute ownership to the class qua class since a 
class is not an entity capable of owning anything.169 
Indeed, it is not even clear that class members have a property right in 
their individual shares.170  Whether they do depends on the best 
interpretation of the substantive law coupled with the small-claim class 
action procedure that enforces it.  This is a complicated point and I will only 
outline the argument here.  The core idea is that the substantive law and 
class action procedure, together, define the substantive entitlements of class 
members and that as a result class members have a right only to a 
distribution that best serves substantive and procedural goals.171  If 
deterrence is the primary goal, as it is for many of the statutory claims that 
class members assert in small-claim class actions,172 what matters most is 
that the defendant pay for the harm it causes, not that class members actually 
receive what the defendant pays.173  It follows that class members do not 
own shares of the recovery in a property sense; they own only what they 
receive from a distribution scheme that optimally serves deterrence goals.174 
                                                          
 168.   The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, for example, rely on the property 
principle to justify distributing left-over funds to class members who have filed claims and already 
received distributions.  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 145, § 3.07(b), cmt. b. 
 169.   Professor David Shapiro has suggested that a class might be conceived as an entity for 
some purposes.  See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 913, 918–19 (1998).  But the entity view, whatever its merits in other respects, makes 
no sense when applied to the distribution of settlement funds.   
 170.   One might argue that class members have a contractual right to settlement proceeds, but 
that right is conditional on whatever cy pres distribution the settlement agreement contemplates.  
 171.   For example, it might be that the best interpretation of the substance-procedure package is 
that class members have at most a right to make claims on the recovered funds and to receive their 
shares if they meet the claiming requirements.   
 172.   See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 173.   Indeed, from a deterrence perspective, substantive goals might be better served by 
distributing the left-over funds to a third party that will use those funds to promote compliance with 
the substantive law.   
 174.   If the class action is the most effective procedural vehicle for enforcing the substantive law 
and achieving the deterrence goal, then class member entitlements are contingent on the distribution 
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There might be sound pragmatic reasons to distribute to class members 
whenever feasible, but that does not mean that class members “own” any 
portion of the recovery.  To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that the 
claims of class members count as “property” within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause.175  However, this holding does not imply that class members 
also have substantive property rights in the remedy.176 
Not surprisingly, courts are a bit confused about all of this.  For 
example, a court might ignore treble damages and focus only on actual loss 
when determining the proper distributions to class members, 
notwithstanding that the substantive law confers a right to treble damages.177  
It is difficult to understand how a property right of the sort cy pres critics 
invoke could possibly stop short of including a class member’s complete 
substantive entitlement.  Moreover, many judges assume that a class 
member’s property includes full compensation for actual loss even when a 
case settles for much less.178  This makes no sense.  In an individual suit, a 
plaintiff does not have a right to full compensation when the suit settles; she 
has a right only to what the settlement gives her.  There is no reason why it 
should be any different for a class action.179 
Given this confusion, it is reasonable to ask whether the property 
argument is really what it seems to be.  We assumed that the argument takes 
the following form: the funds belong to class members, and therefore class 
                                                          
scheme that facilitates effective use of the class action—and that scheme often entails a significant 
cy pres component. 
 175.   See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
 176.   It is not even obvious that class members have a right to class recovery when the 
substantive legal right at issue is justified on grounds other than deterrence.  See Redish et al., supra 
note 8, at 665 (arguing that left-over funds should revert to the defendant because they are the 
defendant’s property until they are actually claimed). 
 177.   See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33–35 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(citing the ALI Principles with approval, but holding that the “next best relief” was a cy pres 
distribution rather than an additional distribution to past claimants in order to satisfy their treble 
damages claims, because “the consumer fund was established for the benefit of all consumer 
purchasers of Lupron, not just the 11,000 who filed claims”). 
 178.   See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting 
that for purposes of authorizing a cy pres distribution, “[i]t is not true that class members with 
unliquidated damage claims in the underlying litigation are ‘fully compensated’ by payment of the 
amounts allocated to their claims in the settlement”); Klier v. Elf Atochem N.A., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 
475 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that “[b]ecause the settlement funds are the property of the class,” 
unclaimed funds must be distributed to class members whenever feasible, “except where an 
additional distribution would provide a windfall to class members with liquidated-damages claims 
that were 100 percent satisfied by the initial distribution”); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 145, § 3.07 
cmt b, at 219 (justifying further distributions to the class by noting that “few settlements award 100 
percent [recovery]”). 
 179.   Even apart from the settlement, class members are entitled at most to the expected value of 
their claims before trial, and expected value discounts the substantive entitlement by the likelihood 
of success.  BONE, ECONOMICS OF PROCEDURE, supra note 119. 
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members (not some third party) should receive the funds.  However, the 
argument makes more sense in reverse: class members should receive the 
funds, and therefore the funds belong to class members.  And class members 
should receive the funds because that is what adjudication is supposed to do.  
When the argument is understood in this way, the normative work is done 
not by property rights, but by a theory of adjudicative legitimacy that 
prescribes what adjudication should and should not do. 
IV.  THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT 
No matter how strongly one supports class actions—and I count myself 
as a very strong supporter—one cannot deny that a small-claim class action 
without strict ascertainability and with cy pres is a rather odd litigation beast.  
The lawsuit has anonymous—in fact irrelevant—right holders and a lawyer 
with no reason to care about her clients; it has a defendant who is unable to 
identify the persons against whom it must defend and a judge who has no 
basis for regarding plaintiffs as individuals, and it involves relief that need 
not benefit right holders as long as it secures deterrence for the public at 
large.180  And all of this is tolerated in a case where each plaintiff has her 
own individual substantive right that entitles her to damages for her own 
personal loss. 
None of these features affect the manageability or efficiency of the class 
action.  Nor are they about whether the court can send notice to class 
members or determine preclusive effects in future suits.  And they are 
certainly not about agency costs or judicial abuse.  If these features are 
troubling, it is because they raise doubts about the legitimacy of the class 
action procedure that produces them.  The concern is that a class action with 
these features does not belong in adjudication given what adjudication is 
supposed to do. 
These legitimacy concerns crop up from time to time.  In their 2010 
article, Professor Martin Redish and his co-authors mount an attack on cy 
pres that relies in large part on Article III, Rules Enabling Act, and 
separation-of-powers arguments grounded in legitimacy concerns.181  
                                                          
 180.   In consumer class actions, there is no assurance that class members will make any future 
purchases when they believe the defendant has wronged them.  So the lawsuit’s deterrent effect is 
likely to benefit class members only indirectly as members of the public and not in any personal 
way.   
 181.   Redish et al., supra note 8, at 641–50.  At its core, this legitimacy critique assumes that 
courts can only award damages for rights violations, and then only in favor of persons whose rights 
have actually been violated.  Cy pres supposedly transgresses these limits by forcing defendants to 
pay third parties who are not adverse to them and whose rights have not been violated—thus 
exceeding the limits of Article III—and also by substituting what is in practical effect a “civil fine” 
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Moreover, occasionally one sees glimmers of the legitimacy critique in 
judicial opinions.  For example, some judges justify strict ascertainability 
and limited cy pres by linking them to Article III.182  Also, some treat 
ascertainability as a threshold, even axiomatic, condition that must be 
satisfied in addition to the functionally-oriented Rule 23 requirements, a 
view that points to deeper foundations for ascertainability than functional 
efficacy.183  Occasionally judges criticize cy pres for penalizing the 
defendant or promoting “social engineering,” and these arguments signal a 
concern about the proper limits on judicial power in civil cases.184 
                                                          
for the compensatory regime created by the substantive law—thus violating the Rules Enabling Act 
and separation-of-powers principles.  Id. at 641–44 (Article III); 644–50 (Rules Enabling Act and 
separation of powers).  While I engage the legitimacy critique underlying these legal arguments in 
the text, I do not address the legal arguments themselves.  Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that 
Professor Redish and his co-authors rely on an unnecessarily crabbed interpretation of Article III and 
an excessively narrow, indeed formalistic, reading of the Rules Enabling Act and separation-of-
powers principles.  Cy pres does not force a defendant to pay a third party who has suffered no legal 
injury.  The defendant pays only what the substantive law says it should pay.  Cy pres affects the 
distribution of defendant’s total liability, a matter as to which the defendant has no constitutional 
interest. And it does so by assuring that left-over funds are distributed in a way that serves the 
purposes of the substantive law.  To be sure, cy pres enables small-claim class actions, but small-
claim class actions aim to further the deterrence purposes of the substantive law.  But see id. at 653–
56 (criticizing small-claim class actions as “faux class actions”).  Thus, cy pres does not improperly 
modify the substantive law; to the contrary, it assures that the substantive law is properly enforced 
and its policies served.  It is not at all clear why this should offend Article III, the Rules Enabling 
Act, or separation-of-powers principles.   
 182.   See, e.g., Sherrod v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, Case No. 2:13-cv-36, 2016 WL 
25979, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2016) (“Ascertainability is either an ‘implied requirement’ of Rule 
23 . . . or an inherent requirement of Article III.”).  In addition, some judges note the availability of 
alternative enforcement mechanisms when dismissing on ascertainability grounds, suggesting 
perhaps that the alternatives are more legitimate. See, e.g., Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., 
Case No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 WL 580696, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (mentioning attorney 
general actions brought on behalf of the state).   
 183.   See 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 48, 3:1 (noting that some courts treat 
ascertainability as “axiomatic” and “fundamental” and noting that it is linked to due process and 
class action legitimacy); 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, § 23.21[1] (stating that it is 
“axiomatic” that “a class must exist”).  See also Shaw, supra note 5, at 2400–402, n.206 (noting that 
courts that treat ascertainability as a threshold requirement see it as “a feature of a cohesive group,” 
but criticizing this position).   
 184.   See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (objecting to judges getting involved in ordering cy pres without 
party agreement as “an exercise in social engineering by a judge, who . . . has no legitimate plaintiff 
to give the money to” and “a vehicle to punish defendants in the name of social policy, without 
conferring any particular benefit upon any particular wronged person”).  See also Mirfasihi v. Fleet 
Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that cy pres confers an indirect 
benefit on the class and describing it as “purely punitive” when it focuses on disgorging defendant’s 
unlawful gains).  Also, courts sometimes worry more about using cy pres when they have to craft the 
remedy themselves as opposed to simply implementing a cy pres remedy crafted by the parties, a 
distinction that might indicate a concern about the proper limits of judicial power. See, e.g., In re 
Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012) (expressing concern about 
parties leaving the choice of cy pres beneficiary to the discretion of the judge and noting that 
“[d]istribution of funds at the discretion of the court is not a traditional Article III function”).  See 
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The following discussion first examines the standard responses to the 
legitimacy critique and then searches for analogies in current litigation 
practice that support the legitimacy of this form of litigation.  The most 
promising analogy, I shall argue, is to the (b)(2) class action.  This section 
closes with a brief discussion of the analogy’s implications for 
ascertainability and cy pres. 
A. Standard Arguments 
Many critics of strict ascertainability (and to a lesser extent, restricted cy 
pres) argue that the doctrine scuttles small-claim class actions.185  This 
argument, while valid, misses the point.  A proponent of strict 
ascertainability can agree that small-claim class actions are socially 
valuable, yet still deny that they are appropriate for adjudication when they 
involve anonymous classes and attorney-driven, deterrence-focused 
litigation.  In a system of institutional differentiation and separation of 
powers, there are limits to what any branch of government should do, and 
these limits are binding even when judicial intervention might yield socially 
valuable results. 
Some commentators address the legitimacy critique by arguing from the 
dichotomy between private law and public law models of litigation.186  The 
private law model views the primary purpose of adjudication as resolving 
private, dyadic disputes by furnishing individualized, victim-focused 
relief.187  The public law model extends more broadly; it accepts lawsuits 
that vindicate public interests, involve multiple parties, and grant broad 
relief.188  The argument based on this dichotomy starts by linking strict 
                                                          
generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 592-98 (2013) (recounting the history of the modern class action in 
terms of a tension between a broad “regulatory conception” and a narrower “adjectival conception” 
that fit the class action into conventional litigation and eschewed broad regulatory objectives for it). 
 185.   See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015); Briseno v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2017); Gilles, supra note 5, at 307; Shaw, supra 
note 5, at 2378. 
 186.   See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 5, at 309–10, 323.  Professor Abram Chayes set out these two 
models of litigation in a now-famous article published in 1976.  Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 (1976).  Other scholars have 
framed similar dichotomies using different labels.  See Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic 
Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–7 (1985) (highlighting 
differences between the “arbitration model” and the “regulation model”); Owen M. Fiss, The Social 
and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122–25 (1982) (parsing the 
“dispute resolution model” and the “structural reform” model); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the 
Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937–39 (1975) (distinguishing the “Conflict Resolution 
Model” and the “Behavior Modification Model”). 
 187.   See Chayes, supra note 186, at 1282–84.  
 188.   See id. at 1282–84, 1302.  
954 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
ascertainability and limited cy pres with the private law model, and then 
shows that modern litigation better fits the public law model, which supports 
a more liberal approach.  Thus, the legitimacy critique fails because its 
private-law-model premise fails. 
Although this line of reasoning highlights an important aspect of the 
problem—the debate over strict ascertainability and cy pres is a debate over 
the regulatory function of civil adjudication—it fails as an adequate response 
to the legitimacy argument.  Proponents of strict ascertainability and limited 
cy pres need not subscribe to the private law model.  They can accept some 
forms of public law litigation, yet still worry about whether courts should be 
handling anonymous, public-interest-centered, attorney-driven class actions 
that focus on deterrence without much concern for redressing class 
members’ individual claims of right.  More generally, as I have explained 
elsewhere, the private-law/public-law dichotomy oversimplifies litigation 
and lacks sufficient normative content to be able to say much at all about 
what courts should and should not be doing.189 
What is needed is a normative argument that focuses on the specific 
features that make small-claim class actions with weak ascertainability and 
liberal use of cy pres so troubling.  These are: (1) the anonymity, indeed 
virtual irrelevance, of the plaintiff right holders, and (2) the almost exclusive 
focus on deterrence without any substantial interest in compensating class 
members.  The first feature prompts the move to strict ascertainability, and 
the second motivates restrictions on cy pres. These two features are 
troubling because they thrust the regulatory dimension of small-claim class 
actions to the forefront and push the remedial dimension to the background.  
The anonymity of class members highlights the fact that the litigation is not 
really about individual right holders, and the cy pres remedy makes clear 
that the real focus is deterrence, not compensation. 
To determine whether class actions with these two features are 
legitimate, we need a normative theory of adjudicative legitimacy.  
Moreover, any such theory must account for the settled principles and 
practices of contemporary adjudication.  The idea is to construct a 
reasonably coherent set of general principles that fit with the settled aspects 
of litigation practice in an attractive way.190  This is a challenging task.  
                                                          
 189.   Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between 
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995). 
 190.   I have in mind a constructivist approach that closely resembles Ronald Dworkin’s 
interpretive theory and has much in common with John Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–27 (1986) (describing a process of legal reasoning 
grounded in an effort to form “the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal 
practice”).  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–19 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the 
process of seeking a reflective equilibrium).  
2017 JUSTIFYING CLASS ACTION LIMITS 955 
Fortunately, there is a second-best approach that is easier to implement.  The 
idea is to identify well-settled aspects of litigation practice that have 
elements similar to the litigation elements that are so troubling—here, 
anonymous plaintiffs and a dominant deterrence focus—and then see 
whether the policies that justify those well-settled elements can be extended 
to justify the comparable elements in small-claim damages class actions.  In 
other words, the approach I will use here looks for analogies in the way our 
adjudication system already tolerates anonymity and prioritizes deterrence, 
and then compares those analogies to the problematic class action features. 
B. The Punitive Damages Analogy 
Punitive damages might seem a promising place to begin.191  This form 
of relief serves deterrence and retributive goals rather than compensation 
and aims to benefit the public at large, not the individual plaintiff.192  
However, the analogy is not close enough. 
Unlike small-claim class actions with only weak ascertainability, 
lawsuits for punitive damages have identifiable plaintiffs.  Moreover, the 
punitive damage award is ordinarily paid to the plaintiff whose rights have 
been violated and not, as in cy pres, to a third party.193  Indeed, courts tend 
to treat punitives as ancillary to compensation; usually they award punitive 
damages only when the plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory relief.194  
                                                          
 191.   Professor Myriam Gilles does a good job of developing this analogy. Gilles, supra note 5, 
at 323–27. 
 192.   Some law-and-economics scholars argue that punitive damages help to offset systematic 
shortcomings in compensatory damage awards.  See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Punitive Damages, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 228 (Michael G. Faure, ed. 2009).  Still, for these 
scholars, deterrence remains the central goal (along with punishment).  For example, awarding 
punitive damages can improve deterrence by correcting for under-enforcement and for the exclusion 
of certain types of harm from the compensatory award.  Id. at 231-33. 
 193.   Although some states require a portion of the punitive award be paid to the state rather 
than to the plaintiff. See Gilles, supra note 5, at 324. 
 194.   See, e.g., Wolff v. Berkley Inc., 938 F.2d 100, 102–03 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing an award 
of punitive damages under Iowa law when compensatory damages for emotional harm were 
unavailable as a matter of law, noting that “[p]unitive damages are incidental to the main cause of 
action, and must be reasonably proportionate to the harm suffered”); Lowell Staats Mining Co., Inc. 
v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding under Colorado law that 
“[f]ailure to prove the existence of actual damages means that no punitive damages may be 
recovered”).  Even for intentional tort claims involving nominal and punitive damages, “the nominal 
damage award represents the recognition that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm 
has occurred.” Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997) (allowing 
$100,000 punitive-damage award to rest on nominal damages awarded for intentional trespass to 
land).  The exceptions are civil rights claims.  See, e.g., Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 
154, 160 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We agree with the conclusion of several of our sister circuits that a 
punitive damages award under Title VII and § 1981 need not be accompanied by compensatory 
damages. We base our holding on the language of the statute, its provision of a cap, and the purpose 
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And under current Supreme Court jurisprudence at least, punitive damages 
are supposed to focus on plaintiff-specific facts, such as the magnitude of the 
plaintiff’s loss and the nature of the defendant’s actions toward the particular 
plaintiff.195  Thus, lawsuits for punitive damages do not exhibit the degree of 
anonymity and the narrow deterrence focus that cast doubt on the legitimacy 
of small-claim class actions. 
C. The 23(b)(2) Analogy 
There is, however, a more promising analogy: the Rule 23(b)(2) class 
action for injunctive relief.196  Invoking (b)(2) in this way may seem odd to 
some readers.  After all, the (b)(2) class action involves a group-based 
wrong and classwide, group-based relief, whereas the (b)(3) damages class, 
at least paradigmatically, involves an individualized wrong and individual 
relief.  However, the analogy is much closer than it seems at first glance.  
When a statute creates a damages claim and the claim prioritizes deterrence 
as a policy goal, the superficial structural differences between (b)(2) and 
(b)(3) give way to a deeper functional convergence.  A (b)(3) class action 
enforcing a deterrence-based claim has many of the same group 
characteristics as a (b)(2) class action. 
Let me be clear.  I am not suggesting that a small-claim class action for 
damages can be certified under 23(b)(2).  The (b)(2) provision is reserved 
for lawsuits seeking classwide injunctive or declaratory relief.  Rather, my 
point is that the functional similarities between the two types of class action 
justify a similar approach to both.  This is important because, as I explain 
                                                          
of punitive damages under Title VII.”). 
 195.   See Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 418 (2003).  But see Gilles, supra note 5, at 324–27 
(arguing that punitive damages have always fit more comfortably with a public law model, but that 
recent Supreme Court decisions reflect discomfort with the public-law deterrence goal and have tried 
to squeeze punitives into a private law model).  
 196.   The 23(b)(2) class action is the most useful analogy because it is the most proximate to the 
small-claim damages class action.  However, there is a more general class of litigation that is also 
helpful: the private attorney general suit.  See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney 
General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133–37 (2004).  The institution of the 
private attorney general relies on private litigation to further the public interest.  See generally 
Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 294–99 (2016) 
(describing public claims brought by private parties and hybrid claims that combine public and 
private features).  For example, an attorney who represents a civil rights plaintiff might seek a broad 
civil rights injunction that serves the public interest as well as the private interest of her client—and 
possibly even do so with a 23(b)(2) class action.  Moreover, the citizen suit provisions of many 
environmental statutes empower private parties to vindicate the public interest in environmental 
quality by seeking injunctive relief and penalties.  Id. at 294.  In these cases, the real beneficiaries of 
the lawsuit are anonymous members of the public and the primary goal is deter wrongdoing rather 
than compensate victims.  
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below, even the strongest advocates of strict ascertainability refuse to apply 
it to (b)(2) class actions.197 
The analogy to (b)(2) class actions, if successful, has another important 
advantage.  To recall, we are looking for a procedure that has elements 
similar to the two elements that worry us in small-claim class actions—
anonymous plaintiffs and a deterrence focus—and is also a well-settled 
aspect of litigation practice.  The (b)(2) class action satisfies the second 
condition.  As I have explained elsewhere, this type of class action is well 
established.198  Its roots trace back to the public-right representative suit of 
the nineteenth century, and even further back to the general-right 
representative suits in seventeenth and eighteenth century England.199 
1. Construing the Statutory Claim: Deterrence Versus Compensation 
The (b)(2) analogy works only if the private claim for damages serves 
the primary purpose of deterring wrongful conduct rather than compensating 
victims for their losses.  Whether a claim should be understood in this way 
depends on the best interpretation of the statute creating the claim.  There 
are a number of statutory claims that fit this profile, including consumer 
protection and antitrust claims that allow individuals to sue for 
compensation when they suffer only small harms.200 
It is important to bear in mind that a legal right to compensation need 
not necessarily have the ultimate goal of compensating victims for their 
losses.  A legislature can create a right to compensation for the primary 
purpose of deterring wrongful conduct ex ante rather than remedying losses 
ex post.201  In fact, “compensation” simply describes a practice of 
transferring wealth from a defendant injurer to an injured plaintiff.  To 
justify such a practice, one needs a normative theory that explains why the 
transfer should take place.  That theory might be deontological, in which 
case the normative goal would be to compensate for the victim’s harm.  An 
example is the familiar theory of corrective justice, which holds that a 
                                                          
 197.   See, e.g., Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 198.   See Bone, Personal and Impersonal, supra note 20, at 249–50, 272–75, 297–98.  
 199.  Id.  Like the (b)(2) class action, these earlier representative suits focused on the class qua 
class, redressed class-based wrongs and granted class-based remedies, and automatically bound all 
class members without giving them a chance to exit the class or litigate on their own.  Id. 
 200.   See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012); Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); see also 
Gilles & Friedman, supra note 89, at 105–07, 132–36 (arguing that the best account of the small 
claim class action for many statutory claims is that it enables deterrence, not compensation). 
 201.   Professor Redish misses this point when he argues that cy pres violates the Rules Enabling 
Act and separation-of-powers principles.  See Redish et al., supra note 8, at 646.  
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wrongdoer has a moral duty to restore the equilibrium that its wrongful act 
disturbed.202 
However, consumer protection, antitrust, and other regulatory statutes fit 
the deontological paradigm very poorly.  They are better understood as 
implementing consequentialist values; in particular, they grant compensatory 
remedies for small losses in order to deter future wrongful conduct.  The 
proscribed conduct might be wrongful for moral or for economic reasons, 
but the goal is the same—to deter the conduct ex ante rather than redress its 
harms ex post.  Faced with the prospect of private lawsuits seeking 
compensation, a potential wrongdoer expects to pay for the harm it causes, 
and as a result should strike its own private cost-benefit balance in a way 
that encourages compliance with the statutory duty.203 
2. The 23(b)(2) Analogy 
To recall, we are looking for a well-settled litigation practice that 
features anonymous plaintiffs and a dominant deterrence or regulatory focus.  
The 23(b)(2) class action has both elements.  Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a 
class action when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole.”204  The 1966 Advisory Committee created (b)(2) class actions with 
school desegregation and other civil rights suits foremost in mind.205  These 
suits typically involve classes defined by group characteristics, and remedies 
that directly benefit the group qua group and benefit individuals only 
indirectly as members of the group. 
For example, a suit seeking an injunction ordering desegregation of a 
school district features a group-based wrong and a group remedy; neither 
wrong nor remedy singles out individual class members in any personal 
way.  The named plaintiffs allege that the school district discriminated on 
the basis of race, a common group characteristic, and thus, as (b)(2) puts it, 
“acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.”  They 
seek an injunctive remedy that targets this group-based wrong, an injunction 
“respecting the class as a whole,” to use the language of (b)(2).  The 
identities of particular African-American students who happen to be 
attending the targeted schools at the time of the suit do not matter legally.  
                                                          
 202.   See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 524 (1989).  
 203.   Compensation can also provide an insurance benefit, but that benefit is insignificant for 
very small claims.  See Fitzpatrick, supra note 105, at 2069–70.  
 204.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 205.   Marcus, supra note 30, at 695–96. 
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What matters is the class as a group—all African-American students 
attending district schools currently or at any time in the future. 
It is this group quality and impersonal character that explain why strict 
ascertainability is not necessary to certification of a (b)(2) class action.206  In 
Shelton v. Bledsoe, for example, the plaintiff brought a (b)(2) class action for 
injunctive relief on behalf of prisoners in a maximum security prison.207  He 
defined the class as “[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in 
the SMU program at USP Lewisburg.”208  The district court denied 
certification on the ground that the class failed to meet the strict 
ascertainability requirement.209  The Third Circuit reversed, holding that 
strict ascertainability is not necessary to a (b)(2) class action.210  The Court 
noted that “the key” to the (b)(2) class is the “indivisible” nature of the 
remedy: the injunctive or declaratory relief must apply to the class as whole 
and cannot be crafted differently for individual class members.211  It then 
reasoned as follows: 
Because the focus in a (b)(2) class is more heavily placed on the nature 
of the remedy sought, and because a remedy obtained by one member 
will naturally affect the others, the identities of individual class 
members are less critical in a (b)(2) action than in a (b)(3) action. See 
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“When a class seeks an indivisible 
injunction benefitting all its members at once, there is no reason to 
undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether class issues predominate 
or whether class action is a superior method of adjudicating the 
dispute.”); Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143 n. 18 (“Injuries remedied through 
(b)(2) actions are really group, as opposed to individual injuries.” 
(citation omitted)).212 
Thus, the core reason for relieving (b)(2) class actions from the strict 
ascertainability requirement has to do with the group nature of the lawsuit.  
Small-claim class actions aimed at deterrence share this group quality, and it 
is this common feature that justifies exempting those class actions from strict 
ascertainability as well.  For both types of litigation, the wrongful acts and 
                                                          
 206.   For an overview of the case law, see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 48,  
§ 3:7. 
 207.   Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 557 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 208.   Id. at 558. 
 209.   Id. at 559. 
 210.   Id. at 563. 
 211.   Id. at 561. 
 212.   Id.  The Court also mentioned functional reasons for the different treatment, such as the 
fact that there is no reason to give notice for opt out purposes and the injunctive relief does not 
require any distribution to the class.  Id. at 561–62.  However, the group nature of the lawsuit is still 
central; indeed, it is the reason why opt out rights are not given and why injunctive relief is 
classwide and not individualized.   
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the relief sought focus on a group, not on individuals within that group—and 
the group focus makes it legitimate to proceed despite the inability to 
identify individual class members. 
First, consider the nature of the wrong in both cases.  In a (b)(2) class 
action, the defendant must have acted toward the class as a group without 
singling out any class member for individual treatment.213  The same is true 
for most of the (b)(3) class actions.  In Carrera v. Bayer Corp., for example, 
Bayer did not single out any individual consumer.  It communicated its 
supposedly deceptive advertising in a uniform way to consumers as a 
group.214 
Second, the remedial right and the relief requested are group-focused.  
In a (b)(2) class action, class members matter not as individuals, but as 
holders of the particular group-based characteristics that the substantive law 
identifies as salient and that define the class.  The injunctive relief directly 
benefits the group qua group and therefore indirectly benefits anyone who 
happens to possess the group-based characteristics that define the class.  
This is why it does not matter that the plaintiffs are anonymous; their 
individual identities are not legally significant. 
For example, the class in the Shelton case consisted of anyone 
occupying the status of “prisoner,” and the injunctive relief requested sought 
to modify the defendant’s conduct toward prisoners in general, not toward 
any particular prisoner.  As another example, consider a (b)(2) class action 
alleging racial discrimination against African-American employees.  An 
injunction eliminating the racially discriminatory employment practice does 
not provide relief directly to individual employees; rather, it restructures the 
defendant’s employment practices so that all current and future African-
American employees benefit by virtue of their being members of the racial 
group.  Indeed, in theory at least, an injunction would still make sense even 
if all current employees happened to quit at the time the injunction was 
entered and a new set of employees was hired—since the target is the group 
and that group includes new as well as current employees. 
The same is true for small-claim class actions aimed at deterrence.  In 
the Carrera case, for example, the legal claim treated consumers as a 
homogenous group.  The damages remedy was formally individualized, of 
course, but it was functionally collective insofar as its goal was to promote 
                                                          
 213.   For example, the Shelton plaintiff alleged that prison officials had a general policy of 
housing violent prisoners and applied the policy uniformly, violating the Eighth Amendment 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.  Id. at 557–58. 
 214.   Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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general deterrence.  In a case like this, what matters from a legal perspective 
is the aggregate recovery, not any consumer’s individual share.215 
Indeed, there is a kind of functional equivalence between damages and 
injunctive relief in a consumer fraud case like Carrera.  To see this point, 
note that the deterrence goal furthered by awarding damages might also have 
been achieved by an injunction ordering Bayer to set up an independent 
oversight committee to review all its future ads.  If this injunction approach 
were legally available, a (b)(2) class action could probably have been 
certified, and in that case there would have been no strict ascertainability 
requirement.  Of course, an injunctive remedy of this sort is not available for 
this type of case—and maybe for good reason.  The choice of damages 
instead of an injunction minimizes judicial intrusion into the marketplace 
and incentivizes sellers to figure out the optimal approach, thereby enlisting 
the seller’s superior information.  But the damages remedy is not 
fundamentally different from our hypothetical injunction at the policy level.  
The deterrence goal is the same.  And the damages remedy, like the 
hypothetical injunction, benefits the class as a whole, not class members as 
individuals. 
These similarities have strong implications for strict ascertainability.  
Although monetary relief is divisible as a formal matter, it is indivisible as a 
functional matter when its purpose is to deter.  General deterrence is a public 
good, and it is not possible to divide it into individual shares.  Therefore, just 
as the indivisible nature of the group remedy in a (b)(2) suit justifies 
exempting (b)(2) class actions from strict ascertainability, so too the 
indivisible nature of deterrence-oriented damages justifies exempting (b)(3) 
small-claim class actions from strict ascertainability.  In each case, class 
members are not relevant, so there is no legitimacy-based reason for class 
members to be identifiable. 
The (b)(2) analogy also has implications for the use of cy pres.  Insofar 
as general deterrence is the primary goal, it should not matter from a 
legitimacy perspective whether individual members of the class benefit from 
an aggregate settlement, any more than it matters whether current employees 
benefit from a (b)(2) injunction eliminating discriminatory employment 
practices.  In both cases, the benefit that individuals receive flows indirectly 
from the benefit the group qua group receives. 
                                                          
 215.   Nor should it matter that some class members have suffered no legal injury.  This follows 
for a (b)(2) class action from the irrelevance of class members as individuals and the focus on the 
defendant’s acts toward the class qua class.  The same should also be true for a small-claim class 
action, and for the same reason. 
962 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
However, the (b)(2) analogy also implies a limitation on cy pres.  A 
judge is not supposed to use a (b)(2) class action as an excuse to clean up the 
defendant’s practices in general.  Nor is it proper for the judge to slip into 
the injunction a provision that benefits a third party who has no connection 
to the lawsuit.  The injunctive relief must be related to the legal wrong.  How 
tight that relationship should be is a matter of some controversy, but 
everyone agrees that the injunction must at least promote the goals of the 
substantive law.  The same limitation should apply to cy pres.  While 
deterrence demands only that the defendant pay aggregate damages, 
adjudicative legitimacy demands more: the third party who receives the 
settlement funds must be likely to use those funds to further the goals of the 
substantive law.216 
Still, this requirement can be quite flexible.  Some courts insist on a 
rather tight nexus between cy pres beneficiary and substantive law: 
settlement funds must be distributed to the “next-best” recipient after 
distribution to the class.217  The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation adopts a looser requirement: the cy pres beneficiary must only 
have interests that “reasonably approximate those being pursued by the 
class.”218  Many courts follow the ALI’s more flexible approach,219 and the 
analogy with (b)(2) supports doing so.  The idea is to choose a cy pres 
beneficiary who will advance the goals of the substantive law.  This can be 
accomplished without a particularly tight connection between beneficiary 
and substantive claim.  How tight a connection should depend, among other 
things, on the cost of identifying a superior candidate.  Just as the court has 
broad discretion to fashion an injunction in a (b)(2) suit, so too the court 
should have broad discretion to choose (and approve) a cy pres beneficiary. 
                                                          
 216.   In fact, one can make a case for distributing all of the funds to a third party and none to 
class members, given that the third party is more likely to benefit the class as a whole.  However, 
this is inappropriate when, as is usually the case, the substantive law selects compensation as the 
means to achieve deterrence. 
 217.   See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 218.   ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 145, § 3.07(c). 
 219.   See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(adopting the “‘reasonable approximation’ test”); In re Citigroup Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 07-CV-9901, 
2016 WL 4198194, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2016) (rejecting the “rigid and overly restrictive” 
next-best standard in favor of the ALI’s more flexible reasonable approximation test).  The Ninth 
Circuit formulates the standard in terms of a “substantial nexus” between the cy pres distribution and 
the interests of class members in light of “the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the 
underlying statutes, and the interests of the silent class members.”  Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 
811, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that settling parties need not select an “ideal” cy pres recipient, 
since that degree of intrusion into private parties’ negotiations would be undesirable). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article began by calling for a return to the functional vision of the 
1966 Rule 23 revision.  Over the past twenty years, federal courts have 
departed from this vision and significantly limited the class action in ways 
that are difficult to justify on functional grounds.  Strict ascertainability and 
limitations on cy pres are notable examples.  Supporters of these restrictive 
doctrines defend them with functional arguments, but those arguments fail in 
rather obvious ways.  Nevertheless, these supporters have a point, but only if 
their objections are understood in legitimacy, not functional, terms.  If there 
is a reason to worry about class actions with anonymous class members and 
a primary focus on deterrence, it can only be because these class actions are 
inconsistent with conditions for adjudicative legitimacy. 
However, the legitimacy critique does not survive close analysis.  A 
small-claim class action used to enforce a statutory cause of action that 
prioritizes deterrence is very similar to a (b)(2) class action for classwide 
injunctive relief.  And those similarities support the legitimacy of weak 
ascertainability and liberal use of cy pres.  With legitimacy satisfied, rules 
governing ascertainability and cy pres should be evaluated only on 
functional grounds, in keeping with the functional vision that animated the 
1966 revision.  And a functional analysis does not support a restrictive 
approach. 
This Article also makes a more general point.  All too often, the 
contending sides in class action debates frame their arguments in functional 
terms when the debate is better pitched at the level of legitimacy.  This 
mismatch confuses the normative stakes and frustrates efforts to find 
common ground.  If legitimacy is the issue, then legitimacy should be the 
focus.  Debating the merits in legitimacy terms, however, is not an easy 
thing to do; it requires a normative account of the necessary conditions for 
adjudicative legitimacy, and constructing such an account is a challenging 
task.  Still, we have no choice but to meet the challenge squarely if we want 
to make substantial progress in designing a fair, just, and efficient procedural 
system. 
 
